```
1
        NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
 2
        RPTS JAMES CORDES
        HIF120140
 3
 4
 5
 6
        PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE IN THE MEDICARE
 7
        PROGRAM
        TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 2019
 8
 9
        House of Representatives
        Subcommittee on Health
10
        Committee on Energy and Commerce
11
12
        Washington, D.C.
13
14
15
16
             The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m.,
17
        in Room 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Anna G.
18
        Eshoo [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
19
             Members present: Representatives Eshoo, Engel,
20
        Butterfield, Matsui, Castor, Sarbanes, Lujan, Schrader,
21
        Kennedy, Cardenas, Welch, Ruiz, Dingell, Kuster, Kelly,
        Barragan, Blunt Rochester, Rush, Pallone (ex officio),
22
23
        Burgess, Upton, Shimkus, Guthrie, Griffith, Bilirakis, Long,
```

Bucshon, Brooks, Mullin, Hudson, Carter, Gianforte, and

24

25 Walden (ex officio). 26 27 Staff present: Mohammad Aslami, Counsel; Kevin Barstow, 28 Chief Oversight Counsel; Billy Benjamin, Systems 29 Administrator; Jacquelyn Bolen, Professional Staff; Jesseca 30 Boyer, Professional Staff Member; AJ Brown, Counsel; Jeff 31 32 Carroll, Staff Director; Jacqueline Cohen, Chief Environment Counsel; Sharon Davis, Chief Clerk; Luis Domingues, Health 33 Fellow; Jennifer Epperson, FCC Detailee; Elizabeth Ertel, 34 35 Office Manager; Adam Fischer, Policy Analyst; Jean Fruci, Energy and Environment Policy Advisor; Evan Gilbert, Press 36 37 Assistant; Lisa Goldman, Counsel; Waverly Gordon, Deputy 38 Chief Counsel; Tiffany Guarascio, Deputy Staff Director; 39 Caitlin Haberman, Professional Staff Member; Alex Hoehn-40 Saric, Chief Counsel, C&T; Megan Howard, FDA Detailee; Zach 41 Kahan, Outreach and Member Service Coordinator; Rick Kessler, 42 Senior Advisor and Staff Directory, Energy and Environment; 43 Saha Khaterzai, Professional Staff Member; Chris Knauer, 44 Oversight Staff Director; Brendan Larkin, Policy Coordinator; Una Lee, Senior Health Counsel; Jerry Leverich, Counsel; 45 46 Jourdan Lewis, Policy Analyst; Perry Lusk, GAO Detailee;

Dustin Maghamfar, Air and Climate Counsel; John Marshall, 47 Policy Coordinator; Kevin McAloon, Professional Staff Member; 48 Dan Miller, Policy Analyst; Jon Monger, Counsel; Elysa 49 Montfort, Press Secretary; Phil Murphy, Policy Coordinator; 50 Lisa Olson, FERC Detailee; Joe Orlando, Staff Assistant; 51 Kaitlyn Peel, Digital Director; Mel Peffers, Environment 52 Fellow; Alivia Roberts, Press Assistant; Tim Robinson, Chief 53 Counsel; Chloe Rodriguez, Policy Analyst; Nikki Roy, Policy 54 55 Coordinator; Samantha Satchell, Professional Staff Member; Andrew Souvall, Director of Communications, Outreach and 56 Member Services; Sydney Terry, Policy Coordinator; Kimberlee 57 Trzeciak, Senior Health Policy Advisor; Rick Van Buren, 58 59 Health Counsel; Eddie Walker, Technology Director; Teresa 60 Williams, Energy Fellow; Tuley Wright, Energy and Environment 61 Policy Advisor; C.J. Young, Press Secretary; Jennifer 62 Barblan, Minority Chief Counsel, O&I; Mike Bloomquist, 63 Minority Staff Director; Adam Buckalew, Minority Director of 64 Coalitions and Deputy Chief Counsel, Health; Robin Colwell, 65 Minority Chief Counsel, C&T; Jerry Couri, Minority Deputy 66 Chief Counsel, Environment & Climate Change; Jordan Davis, 67 Minority Senior Advisor; Kristine Fargotstein, Minority Detailee, C&T; Margaret Tucker Fogarty, Minority Staff 68 69 Assistant; Melissa Froelich, Minority Chief Counsel, CPAC;

70	Theresa Gambo, Minority Human Resources/Office Administrator;
71	Caleb Graff, Minority Professional Staff Member, Health;
72	Brittany Havens, Minority Professional Staff, O&I Peter
73	Kielty, Minority General Counsel; Bijan Koohmaraie, Minority
74	Counsel, CPAC; Tim Kurth, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel, C&T
75	Ryan Long, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Mary Martin,
76	Minority Chief Counsel, Energy & Environment & Climate
77	Change; Sarah Matthews, Minority Press Secretary; Brandon
78	Mooney, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy; James
79	Paluskiewicz, Minority Chief Counsel, Health; Brannon Rains,
80	Minority Staff Assistant; Zach Roday, Minority Communications
81	Director; Kristen Shatynski, Minority Professional Staff
82	Member, Health; Alan Slobodin, Minority Chief Investigative
83	Counsel, O&I Peter Spencer, Minority Senior Professional
84	Staff Member, Environment & Climate Change; Natalie Sohn,
85	Minority Counsel, O&I Danielle Steele, Minority Counsel,
86	Health; Everett Winnick, Minority Director of Information
87	Technology; and Greg Zerzan, Minority Counsel, CPAC.

Ms. Eshoo. The Subcommittee on Health will now come to order. Good morning, everyone. And I am going to recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement.

Our subcommittee continues its work to lower drug prices for seniors and for families across our country. Last month the members of the subcommittee passed six bipartisan bills to make prescription drugs more affordable by increasing market competition. Today, we are going to take a close look at the Medicare program to understand what is leading to high prescription drug costs for the 60 million Americans who get their drugs through Medicare.

To inform our work, we have present to hand, Dr.

Matthews, the Executive Director of MedPAC, the Medicare

Payment Advisory Commission. MedPAC provides valuable

nonpartisan advice to Congress on the Medicare program.

We need expert advice. Drug prices are skyrocketing and Congress must act, and wants to act. Before we do, we have to, I believe, do as best we can to do a deep dive to understand the Medicare program and its challenges.

Medicare accounts for one out of every three dollars spent on prescription drugs. And drug spending is growing rapidly each year. Whether a patient gets their drugs at the hospital under the Part B program, or the pharmacy counter

111 through the Part D program, costs are rising.

In the Part B program, Medicare drug spending doubled from 2009 to 2017. We spent \$32 billion, that's with a B, on Part B drugs in 2017. Part D drug spending has also nearly doubled over the past ten years. We spent \$80 billion in the Part D program in 2017.

These rising costs are putting, I believe, unsustainable pressure on the Medicare program and on America's families.

In a recent Kaiser Family Foundation poll, 23 percent of seniors say it is difficult to afford their medications. I know it is true for my constituents, and for all of my colleagues constituents as well.

We hear from people on a consistent basis. They are worried that when they leave their doctors' office appointments with a new prescription written out for them they are not sure whether they can pay for it, afford it or not.

America leads the world in innovative health care, but soon, few people will be able to afford this cutting-edge care. This committee, through our work on the 21st Century Cures Act, promoted development of novel, breakthrough treatments. But, with the development of these treatments has come increased spending.

134	Spending on drugs in specialty tiers has grown nearly
135	1,000 percent over ten years, from \$3.4 billion in 2007 to
136	\$37.1 billion in 2017.
137	Because Medicare has no limit on out-of-pocket spending,
138	people who rely on specialty drugs are hit especially hard.
139	One study found needing a single specialty drug could cause
140	people on Medicare to spend anywhere from \$2,000 to \$16,000
141	out-of-pocket annually.
142	Every senior deserves high-value, innovative medicine to
143	improve their lives, but rapidly increasing costs affect
144	their ability to get the drugs they need. So, we need
145	solutions.
146	Today's hearing is yet another step closer to our, well,
147	I would say it is a very important step towards our bringing
148	forward solutions to what I just described.
149	So, welcome to Dr. Matthews. And I look forward to your
150	expert advice on improving the Medicare Part D program.
151	And with that, I will now recognize Mr. Bucshon, who
152	will is taking the place of Dr. Burgess this morning, who
153	has to be at the Rules Committee.
154	Welcome. And it is nice to sit next to you. Mr.
155	Bucshon. Thank you. It is nice to sit next to you, also.
156	Madam Chairwoman, thank you for holding this important

hearing today. I appreciate this opportunity to members to take a deeper look at the drug coverage offered to seniors under Medicare Part B and Part D. These programs provide critical health care coverage for American seniors. And getting a better understanding of where these programs are today will help ensure that we can -- they can meet the needs of seniors tomorrow.

As we have been exploring drug pricing in this subcommittee and in the committee, this is an important opportunity to hear from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, a nonpartisan organization that is tasked with providing technical advice to Congress. MedPAC is an important resource for Congress as we look to address challenging issues, such as Medicare's ability to provide adequate and affordable drug coverage to seniors, and the impacts any programmatic changes may have on beneficiaries, providers, and taxpayers.

Medicare Part B covers drugs that are administered by a physician through infusion or injection in an office or outpatient setting. These drugs include many high-cost chemotherapy agents, and other critical lifesaving medications.

Medicare Part D provides a prescription drug benefit to

beneficiaries, and participation is voluntary. The Part D program has been a success. According to a recent MedPAC report, it has improved beneficiaries' access to prescription drugs.

Generic drugs now account for nearly 90 percent of the prescriptions filled. Enrollees' average premiums for basic benefits have remained around \$30 per month for many years. More than eight in ten Part D enrollees report they are satisfied with the program. Furthermore, because of the deliberate structure of Part D, which incentivizes private health insurers to compete against one another, the program has been wildly successful in holding down costs to taxpayers.

In 2016, Part D expenditures were approximately \$100 billion, which was less than half of the \$205.5 billion projected by the CBO in 2006. In fact, over the first ten years that Part D was in operation, CBO data shows that the program cost taxpayers \$555.8 billion less than originally projected.

While Part B and Part D operate differently and cover different medications, they both provide seniors with access to necessary treatments and lifesaving drugs. It is important that any suggested changes to these program be well

203 understood, and the impacts on patients, providers, and 204 taxpayers be carefully considered. 205 The Trump administration has made a vow to lower costs 206 of drugs, and has proposed changes to both Medicare Part D, B 207 and D, to address the rising list prices, out-of-pocket costs 208 for patients, and costs to the Federal Government. 209 proposed changes to how Medicare operates and provides drugs under Part B and D should be carefully analyzed to understand 210 211 their full impact. 212 It is important that members of Congress on both sides of the aisle work together and, with the Administration, find 213 214 solutions to lower list prices and out-of-pocket costs while 215 maintaining robust access to seniors, without penalizing 216 physicians, taxpayers, or stifling innovation. 217 As the Energy and Commerce Committee considers 218 legislative proposals to address the high cost of drugs, I 219 appreciate the important resource that MedPAC provides 220 Congress. I want to thank our witness Dr. Matthews for being 221 here today and I look forward to your testimony. 222 I yield back. 223 [The statement of Mr. Bucshon follows:] 224 225 \*\*\*\*\*\* COMMITTEE INSERT \*\*\*\*\*\*

226	
227	
228	
229	
230	
231	
232	
233	
234	
235	
236	
237	
238	
239	
240	
241	
242	
243	
244	
245	
246	Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
247	The chair now recognizes Mr. Pallone, chairman of the full
248	committee, for five minutes for his opening statement.

The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Today we are continuing this committee's important work in providing Americans relief when it comes to the skyrocketing price of prescription drugs. We have already passed several bills that will remove barriers that delay cheaper generic drugs from coming to market. And today we are focusing on the rising costs of prescription drugs in the Medicare program so we can begin to think about solutions to drive down costs for America's seniors and for the Federal Government.

We have all heard the stories about Americans who cannot afford their medications, who are rationing their life-saving therapies, or choosing not to fill their prescriptions because they instead need to put food on the table. And, at the same time, we have watched as prescription drug spending continues to cost the Federal Government more and more each year. And we simply can't afford to wait any longer to fix this broken system.

The way drug prices are set, and the opaque drug supply chain, has fostered a system that can be gamed for profit at the expense of seniors who need access to affordable medicines.

I want to thank James Matthews, the Executive Director

of MedPAC, for testifying. MedPAC is a critical resources to Congress and provides invaluable nonpartisan policy recommendations on how to improve the Medicare program for beneficiaries. And MedPAC has conducted significant work on prescription drug pricing in the Medicare program. And I look forward to hearing from Dr. Matthews on how we pay for drugs under Parts B and Prescription drugs, and how we can lower drug costs.

But this is particularly concerning in the Part D program, where high cost specialty drugs represent a large and growing share of the Part D spending. According to MedPAC, spending for specialty drugs has grown more than ten times since the beginning of the Part D program. And that growth resulted in specialty drug claims making up nearly a quarter of all gross Part D spending in 2017. And it is now estimated that between 2019 and '23, nearly two-thirds of newly-launched drugs will be considered specialty drugs.

These high cost specialty drugs are partly responsible for the fact that each year more beneficiaries are reaching the catastrophic phase of the Part D benefit. In 2016, over 360,000 Medicare beneficiaries reached the catastrophic limit of \$4,850 out-of-pocket, that threshold, in just one visit to the pharmacy. That's a significant jump from only 33,000

beneficiaries in 2010. And this leaves beneficiaries, particularly those with serious, chronic, or life-threatening diseases at risk for substantial out-of-pocket costs.

So, I look forward to hearing from Dr. Matthews about MedPAC's proposal to add an out-of-pocket limit to the Part D program. I hope we can work together on a bipartisan basis to implement some of these ideas in order to provide seniors with peace of mind that they will be protected if they need these high-cost therapies.

MedPAC has also noted that the current structure of the Part D program may be eroding incentives for Prescription Drug Plans to control costs. Currently, the Federal Government pays 80 percent of the costs for Part D benefits in the catastrophic phase of coverage. And this means that payers may not be incentivized to effectively manager costs for their most expensive enrollees since the government is footing most of the bill.

We will also discuss Part B drug spending, which has increased at an average rate of almost 10 percent annually for the past decade. These increases are primarily driven by rising drug prices, which have a direct impact on out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries, because most beneficiaries are responsible for paying a 20 percent coinsurance on their

318 Part D drug -- Part B drugs. And so, I look forward to examining proposals to slow rapid price growth and increase 319 320 competition in the Part B drug program as well. 321 And while most groundbreaking drugs are coming to 322 market, and they really are saving lives, and increasing quality of life, and helping seniors to better manage 323 324 diseases, but these therapies often come with price tags that are unaffordable for the average American. And these prices 325 326 represent a significant long-term financial challenge to the 327 Federal Government and to the Medicare program. So, we have to find solutions that promote greater affordability and 328 329 access. And I look forward to that discussion today. 330 So, I don't think anybody else wants my time, Madam 331 Chair, I yield back. Thank you. Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman 332 yields back. 333 The chair now is pleased to recognize Mr. Walden, the 334 ranking member of the full committee, for five minutes for 335 his opening statement. 336 Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you 337 for holding this hearing. This hearing continues this committee's important work 338 339 on bringing down the costs of prescription drugs for seniors, 340 frankly for all Americans, and patients across the country,

but especially seniors in the Medicare program.

I want to thank our witness. Doctor, we are delighted to have you here as Executive Director of Medicare's Payment Advisory Commission, more commonly known as MedPAC. The work you do there, and your team, is really important. MedPAC provides a really valuable service to lawmakers. And as an independent nonpartisan commission, provides data analysis and policy recommendations to improve the Medicare system, which we all care deeply about.

We value this input and we really appreciate the work of the commission.

Today we call on MedPAC's expertise with respect to rising prescription drug costs in the Medicare system. This committee has a long history on this issue, including the creation of Part D, which some of us were on the committee then and did the full overnight mark-up, and 60 amendments, and a lot of back and forth, but we got it done. That was back in 2003.

Nearly 44 million Medicare beneficiaries use Medicare

Part D today. I remember there was talk then that nobody

would write one of those plans, it will never get off the

ground, it will cost a fortune. And, actually, it has worked

pretty well. Now there are some tweaks all these years later

we need to look at.

It is important to note the overwhelming majority of seniors who have Part D are satisfied with their plan. The premiums have remained stable and, frankly, relatively low throughout the program's history. The program has largely been a good success. And harnessing the power of competition to create a working market has given consumers more choices than anybody thought possible, and has helped keep prices down.

Now, there are challenges to Medicare Part D that have grown over time and have saddled some beneficiaries with significant increases in their out-of-pocket costs.

Additionally, the share of Medicare Part D spending attributable to the catastrophic stage of coverage, has increased from 14 percent of the program costs in 2006 to 40, four zero, percent in 2017. So, we should confront these issues now to modernize Part D and keep drugs affordable for seniors, and address misaligned incentives to drive up costs.

The same goes for Part B where a small number of drugs represent a large percentage of government and beneficiary spending on the program. As others have noted, Part B drug spending has increased almost 10 percent per year since 2009. While there has been tremendous development, especially

drugs, that can effectively treat cancer and other diseases in amazing ways, these rising costs must also be confronted.

So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, or our witness, on whether the current structure of how Part B drugs are reimbursed can and should be modified to foster competition and to lower prices. One consistent concern I hear about from my constituents in Oregon, and I have done 20 town halls so far this year, is the high cost of prescription drugs. I know that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have heard similar concerns in their districts as well.

We have worked in a bipartisan manner on lowering drug costs over the last several years. During my tenure as chairman of this committee and during the first few months of this year we have continued those efforts. So, I believe that that should continue. And this hearing will help us further our bipartisan work to lower drug costs for American consumers and seniors who rely upon Medicare.

So, thanks again, Doctor, for being here today and the good work you do at MedPAC.

With that, Madam Chair, I yield back. Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.

The chair would like to remind members that, pursuant to committee rules, all members' written opening statements

410	shall be made part of the record. So, get them in.
411	I would now like to introduce our witness for today's
412	hearing, Dr. Jim Matthews. He serves as the Executive
413	Director of the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee, and a
414	very important position, a very important commission. And
415	once again, thank you for being here today to be instructive
416	to us. And we certainly look forward to your testimony.
417	You have testified many times in Congress, so I don't
418	think I need to explain the lighting system to you. The most
419	important one is when it turns red, because that is when your
420	five minutes are up.
421	So, Dr. Matthews, thank you again. You are now
422	recognized for five minutes of testimony.

423 STATEMENT OF JAMES E. MATTHEWS, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 424 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION 425 426 Mr. Matthews. Thank you. Good morning, Chairwoman 427 Eshoo, Dr. Bucshon, and distinguished committee members. On behalf of MedPAC, a nonpartisan, independent congressional 428 429 advisory agency, I am here to convey information on Medicare's payments for prescription drugs. 430 431 First, I will describe how Medicare pays for drugs under 432 Part B, and discuss recent trends in spending and utilization. 433 434 Second, I will do the same with Part D. 435 Lastly, I will touch briefly on commission recommendations that address these trends. 436 437 I will start with Part B. Part B covers drugs that are 438 typically administered by a provider, such as infused 439 chemotherapy drugs. Medicare pays for Part B drugs based on 440 the average sales price that manufacturers report for a drug, 441 net of most rebates and discounts. Medicare pays providers 442 the actual sales price, plus a 6 percent add-on, regardless 443 of how much the individual provider has spent to purchase the 444 drug. Medicare makes a separate payment to the provider for 445 administering the drug.

446 Part B spending has grown roughly 10 percent a year since 2009, reaching \$32 billion in 2017. Growth in Medicare 447 448 spending for drugs under Part B is driven largely by rising prices, which account for two-thirds of overall spending 449 450 growth, and which reflect manufacturers' significant pricing leverage. Under the current payment system, as drug prices 451 rise, Medicare's payments will follow. And Medicare has few 452 tools to affect prices under Part B. 453 454 Part D uses private plans to deliver Medicare's outpatient prescription drug benefit. Part D plans negotiate 455 with pharmacies over payment rates for filling prescriptions, 456 457 and with drug manufacturers for post-sale rebates. Medicare is prohibited from interfering in these negotiations. 458 459 There are two components of Medicare's payments to plans 460 for Part D basic benefits. 461 First, there is a per-enrollee payment based on plans' 462 bids, which reflects their expected costs for the Part D 463 benefit for an average enrollee. 464 The second is individual reinsurance, which are cost-465 based payments to plans for which Medicare covers 80 percent 466 of the costs in the catastrophic phase of the benefit. Part B -- Part D spending grew at about 7 percent 467 468 annually between 2010 and 2017, reaching \$80 billion. But

Medicare's reinsurance payments for Part D enrollees who had drug spending high enough to reach the catastrophic phase grew almost 20 percent annually over the same period. Again, high-cost therapies drive these trends. Part D spending for high-priced specialty tier drugs grew tenfold between 2007 and 2017. And, again, this growth is driven by price.

In 2017, 370,000 beneficiaries filled a single prescription that was so expensive it would push them into the catastrophic phase of the benefit, up from just 33,000 such beneficiaries in 2010.

When plans have financial responsibility for insurance risk, they face greater incentives to manage costs. However, growth in reinsurance, recent changes to the coverage gap, and the growth in high-cost medicines may be eroding plans' incentives to and ability to control costs. In fact, Part D's benefit structure may give plans a financial incentive to play certain high-cost, high-rebate drugs on their formularies, even when lower cost alternatives are available.

Growth in drug prices substantially affects Medicare drug spending. This growth reflects both higher prices for existing products and the launch of new high-price drugs.

Yet, again, Medicare has very limited influence over drug prices.

492 Recent commission recommendations attempt to address the growth in Medicare drug spending. In Part B we would give 493 494 clinicians an alternative to the "buy and bill" environment, 495 and provide incentives for them to use this approach. 496 In Part D we would shift more liability for costs in the catastrophic phase of the benefit to plans. In exchange, we 497 498 would give plans more tools and flexibility to manage enrollees' utilization. We would also eliminate beneficiary 499 500 cost-sharing in the catastrophic phase. 501 In sum, prescription drugs are essential to treating many medical conditions, and Medicare must ensure that 502 503 beneficiaries have access to appropriate medication 504 therapies. At the same time, high prices for drugs make it 505 difficult to ensure this access, while protecting the 506 taxpayers and beneficiaries who funds the program. We hope 507 the committee regards the commission as a resource as you 508 develop policies to address these critical issues. 509 Thank you. 510 [The prepared statement of Mr. Matthews follows:] 511 \*\*\*\*\*\* INSERT 1 \*\*\*\*\*\* 512

513 Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Dr. Matthews. 514 We have now concluded the opening statements and we will 515 move to member questions. Each member will have five minutes 516 to ask questions of Dr. Matthews. And I will start by recognizing myself for five, for five minutes. 517 518 Again, thank you, Dr. Matthews. In my opening statement 519 I spoke about the increase in spending on specialty drugs. And you, you also have spent part of your testimony on 520 521 specialty drugs in the Medicare Part D program, and what that means for seniors. 522 523 You point out that plans may not have the incentive or 524 the ability to control the costs of specialty drugs. So, 525 what, can you restate for us what exactly MedPAC believes 526 what plans can do to better manage the costs of the new 527 specialty drugs? 528 And, of course it is not just Medicare being hit by the 529 trend in high-cost drugs. We have -- well, I have some other 530 questions, too. Maybe I should just put all my questions out 531 and you can answer them. 532 VA, Medicaid, and private plans, how are they managing 533 this trend? 534 How to other federal programs like the VA and TRICARE 535 leverage their buying power for these products?

536	And what is the effect of high-cost drugs well, we
537	know what the effect of high-cost drugs on beneficiaries is.
538	Does MedPAC have a recommendation relative to an out-of-
539	pocket cap needed for Medicare drug costs?
540	I know that you said that Medicare has very little
541	authority relative to pricing but, you know, we want to
542	examine everything, every angle of this Rubik's Cube. And
543	so, if we were to implement such a cap, how would that affect
544	the incentive for drug makers in Part D plans that we have
545	discussed?
546	So, those are my questions. And have at it.
547	Mr. Matthews. Sure. So, and again thank you for the
548	invitation to testify and to clarify. This is my first
549	testimony before Congress.
550	Ms. Eshoo. Oh. Well, bravo. It is not so bad, is it?
551	Mr. Matthews. Not yet.
552	[Laughter.]
553	Ms. Eshoo. This is a friendlier hearing room. It is
554	smaller, it is more personal. So, share your wisdom and your
555	expertise with us.
556	Mr. Matthews. Sure. So, your question has multiple
557	components and I am going to try and get to all of them.
558	First, as you know, Medicare has made a recommendation

in 2016, and slightly modified that recommendation in 2018, to modify the structure of the Part D benefits. And the motivation behind this recommendation hinges on the entry of high-cost, high-rebate drugs into the Part D program, and the incentives that the plans have to place those drugs on their formularies, even when lower cost alternatives are available.

And the incentives are such that the plan can move a beneficiary into the catastrophic phase of the benefits where the plan only has 15 percent liability for those costs under current law. The Medicare program is liable for 80 percent, which it makes on a retrospective cost basis. So, it is counter to the incentives that the plans have to actually manage the benefit above the catastrophic limit.

Plans are not the only actor that might have a role in managing costs at that level. We have started to evaluate additional reforms to the structure of the Medicare Part D benefit that would contemplate a role for the manufacturer to have some financial responsibility above that catastrophic phase, in contrast to current law where the manufacturer is liable for a 70 percent discount on brand name drugs within the coverage gap.

We are contemplating whether or not the incentives might be better for beneficiaries and the program as a whole by

shifting that liability above the catastrophic threshold. 582 583 Ms. Eshoo. Is there any benefit to the beneficiaries relative to rebates in this? 584 585 Mr. Matthews. So, we think that by aligning the 586 incentives for the plans and manufacturers to bargain hard 587 for costs and to manage utilization that that would probably have a more direct and immediate effect on the majority or 588 the totality of Part D enrollees relative to rebates that 589 590 have distorted effects with respect to any individual beneficiary's utilization and costs. 591 592 Ms. Eshoo. And the other, how the other programs, 593 private plans, Medicaid, VA, how are they managing this 594 trend? How do they leverage their buying power for these 595 products? 596 Mr. Matthews. So, so Medicaid has a couple of tools 597 available to the program. And, again, I am not deep on 598 Medicaid because my expertise is primarily Title 18, so I 599 don't want to stray too far out of what I am able to talk 600 about. But Medicaid benefits from a statutory discount and 601 also from a certain inflation rebate that governs how much 602 manufacturers can increase their prices. 603 VA is able to contract directly with manufacturers and 604 suppliers under the Federal Supply Schedule. They can do so

because they actually take delivery of products and can guarantee utilization. But it is my understanding that sometimes VA has been criticized in that they have a closed formulary that in some cases has precluded access to certain innovative medications.

Ms. Eshoo. Well, my time has certainly expired. So now I would like to recognize Mr. Bucshon, who is standing in for the subcommittee ranking member, for his five minutes of questions.

Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Dr. Matthews, MedPAC in the past has recommended a voluntary market-based program for doctors to use third party vendors to obtain drugs in Part D. The Administration, in its advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, proposes setting up a similar system but would make it mandatory for physicians to participate.

I have heard concerns from providers that requiring them to switch to vendors could be very disruptive. Can you discuss why MedPAC opted for a voluntary program, and what features you included to foster competition on drug pricing?

Mr. Matthews. Sure. One of the main reasons that led us to recommend a vendor-based approach to Part D drugs was the potential inflationary incentives inherent in Part B.

Where the higher the cost of the drug, the higher the 6 percent add-on that the provider who administers the drug receives from the program.

And the research is fairly limited as to whether or not providers are actively acting on those incentives but, nonetheless, the incentives are still there. And we feel that getting providers out of the financial incentives related to "buy and bill" would be better served by having them focus more on selecting the drugs that are most appropriate to the given patient.

And so, we have recommended a modernization of the prior competitive acquisition program that Medicare used several years back under which a vendor would be responsible for negotiating prices with manufacturers, and the vendor would be able to pass on those prices to the individual clinicians or providers who prescribe drugs under Part B.

Mr. Bucshon. Can I ask a question there?

Mr. Matthews. Sure.

Mr. Bucshon. Because if you add another middle person, just so you are going to -- you might, there might be some savings but you are going to eat some of that up; right?

Mr. Matthews. Under our construct there would be a couple of parameters that would govern the ability of a

651	provider to eat up those savings.
652	One, under our construct savings would accrue to the
653	vendor, and savings would also accrue to the clinicians who
654	voluntarily elected to participate in that vendor's
655	negotiated prices.
656	The second thing that we would do
657	Mr. Bucshon. So that would be the difference between
658	voluntary and mandatory then essentially; right?
659	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir, that's correct.
660	Mr. Bucshon. Okay.
661	Mr. Matthews. The second thing we would do is under our
662	recommendation we would have a requirement that the vendor
663	negotiate prices no higher than 100 percent of ASP as
664	currently pertains to the market. So, there would be a
665	couple of ways to govern any potential price increases on the
666	Medicare
667	Mr. Bucshon. Well, couldn't you, couldn't you just do
668	that? Couldn't we just do that without a vendor in the
669	middle? We could just say we are I mean, that has been
670	tried, right? There was a demonstration project?
671	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir.
672	Mr. Bucshon. In a previous administration cutting it
673	down to ASP plus I think 2 point some percent. I can't

674 remember. 675 Mr. Matthews. So, the current sequester effectively reduces Medicare payments for Part B drugs from the statutory 676 ASP plus 6 to ASP plus 4.3 percent. 677 Mr. Bucshon. Yeah, yeah. 678 679 Okay, the demonstration project, which didn't happen, --Mr. Matthews. Right. 680 681 Mr. Bucshon. -- was even lower than that. 682 Mr. Matthews. Right. 683 Mr. Bucshon. I have another question, so I will move on from there. 684 685 But first of all, as a physician I think there automatically is an assumption that physicians out there will 686 687 choose higher price, a higher priced product to make more money. And I will just push back on that and say that I 688 689 think there are maybe people that would do that. But I would 690 argue that the vast majority of physicians make decisions on 691 which medications to use for patients based on known clinical 692 knowledge based on standard of care in their community. I 693 just want to say that up front. 694 But we do, but there are incentives. Not disagreeing 695 with that.

In MedPAC's recommendation for Part D it suggests that

696

plan sponsors be given more financial incentives to manage the benefits of high-cost enrollees by shifting more of the plan payments from open-ended reinsurance to capitaged payments. As part of a -- part of this suggestion, plan sponsors would be given more flexibility to use "formulary tools."

As a physician I have had some problems with those "formulary tools" such as step therapy and prior authorization for many years. That could delay patient access to timely medications, disrupt treatment regimens for stable patients and create unnecessary physician burden.

Did MedPAC consider these potential impacts to patients and physicians before providing this recommendation?

Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir, we did. And, as always, there is a balance or set of tradeoffs involved in these kinds of decisions where you want to give the plans the leverage with manufacturers to negotiate prices and incentive to manage utilization versus any potential speed bumps that those tools put in front of providers and patients in terms of timely access to the medications.

So, we have talked with stakeholders in the course of developing our recommendations. And we do understand the frustration that some of these utilization management tools

720 create. But, at the same time it is a question of the 721 tradeoffs and the balance that we are trying to achieve for 722 the program as a whole. 723 Mr. Bucshon. Okay, great. Thank you. My time has 724 expired and I yield back. 725 Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman and he yields back. The chair now recognizes Mr. Pallone, the full committee 726 chairman, for his five minutes of questioning. 727 728 The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I wanted to kind of follow up on some of those things that 729 you mentioned, Madam Chair. 730 731 Let me start with Part D. MedPAC has analyzed that 732 between 2007 and 2017, Part D program spending increased from \$46 billion to about \$80 billion, for an average increase of 733 734 5.6 percent per year, which I think is unsustainable. 735 Dr. Matthews, can you explain why we are seeing these steep 736 spending increases in Part D? 737 And it is my understanding that a smaller portion of 738 high-cost beneficiaries are driving the majority of Part D 739 spending; and is that correct? 740 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir, that is correct. 741 As one of the members said in the opening statements, 742 Part D has been successful in shifting a substantial amount

of utilization among Part D enrollees to generics, which the commission has supported. But at the same time, we are seeing the entry of new high-cost specialty drugs into the program. And over the last several years it is those drugs that have been predominantly driving the increases in spending that we have documented.

The Chairman. Now, I know you talked a little bit about some of MedPAC's solutions to control spending in response to Chairman Eshoo. But would you, would you develop that a little more? What are some of MedPAC's solutions to control spending in the future?

Mr. Matthews. Okay. So, again, under Part D one of the key elements that we would do is restructure the benefit to give plans more of an incentive to manage utilization above the catastrophic limit. We feel that having the program be responsible for 80 percent of those costs above the catastrophic limit is inconsistent with the notion that Part D was founded on, which was that Part D plans would compete with manufacturers in order to generate the best possible price for the enrollees in order to keep premiums low.

So, we feel that the incentives currently has negated plans' ability to do that somewhat.

As we have been discussing the growth in Medicare

766 spending for drugs under Parts B and D since then, we have 767 become more attuned to the influence of these new, high-cost 768 therapies. And we are starting, as I said earlier, to 769 contemplate whether or not manufacturers, who do indeed 770 control the price, should have a greater liability for 771 spending in the catastrophic phase of the benefit. 772 Again, the commission has not made any formal recommendation there yet, but it is something that we are 773 774 very actively engaged in doing. 775 The Chairman. Let me get into two more guestions. This 776 is the last one on Part D, then I want to ask about Part B. 777 You talked about generics. You know, we are very proud of the fact that on a bipartisan basis we reported out a 778 779 package of generic competition bills that I think are going 780 to go to the floor soon. But, of course, if you have these 781 single source drug therapies, there is no competition. 782 Right? So, we know often that these innovative products can 783 change lives, the single source. But without competition how 784 difficult is it to control the cost of those therapies in 785 particular? 786 Mr. Matthews. We believe it is difficult. And that is 787 one factor that has led us to contemplate going further than 788 our 2016 benefit restructuring recommendation. And again,

789	here the recommendation was to have plans liable for 80
790	percent of those costs.
791	But, if we are talking about true sole-source products
792	for which there are no competitors, the plans are going to
793	have fairly limited negotiating leverage with which to
794	negotiate hard on price with the manufacturers.
795	And that is why we are starting to contemplate whether
796	or not the manufacturers should have some liability for costs
797	above the catastrophic phase.
798	The Chairman. All right. Now let me address Part D.
799	I was struck by the rate of rapid annual growth in Part
800	D drugs mentioned in your testimony, almost 10 percent
801	spending increases annually for the past decade. So, one
802	question.
803	Could you provide some examples of the most expensive
804	drugs in the Part D program and the conditions they treat?
805	And what are some of the annual per-user costs for these
806	drugs? And what is the beneficiary's responsibility for
807	these costs?
808	Mr. Matthews. Sure. And just to clarify, this is D?
809	The Chairman. D now. This is my only question about D,
810	yes.
811	Mr. Matthews. Yes, of course.

812	So, a lot of the high-cost drugs that we have been
813	seeing over the last several years are high-cost specialty
814	drugs, predominantly biologics. All of the top ten drugs for
815	Part D in terms of spending are biologics. They are used to
816	treat conditions such as cancer and its side effects,
817	rheumatoid arthritis, and ocular conditions such as macular
818	degeneration.
819	The Chairman. All right. Thank you so much.
820	Thank you, Madam Chair.
821	Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman, and he yields back.
822	The chair now recognizes Mr. Walden, the full committee
823	ranking member for his five minutes.
824	Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
825	And again, Doctor, thank you for the work you do, and
826	your team.
827	We know that a lot of surveys show seniors like Medicare
828	Part D, like a 90 percent approval rating. But we also see
829	some disturbing trends. And I wanted to ask you about some
830	of that.
831	I hear a lot about the rising out-of-pocket costs for
832	seniors. And I have some concerns that some of the changes
833	to the Part D program provide incentives to use brands over
834	generics, and particularly as it relates to true out-of-

835	pocket cost, the acronym TrOOP, calculations.
836	So, if a senior used only generics they would have to
837	spend about \$5,100 to reach the catastrophic stage of
838	coverage; correct?
839	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. That sounds about right.
840	Mr. Walden. And so, due to the way TrOOP is calculated,
841	I am told a senior would have to spend only \$2,275 in a year
842	to reach catastrophic coverage if they use only brands. Is
843	that?
844	Mr. Matthews. Without commenting on the specific dollar
845	amounts, I believe the proportions are correct.
846	Mr. Walden. Okay. And how have these incentives then
847	affected Part D formularies and plan design? What is
848	happening in this?
849	Mr. Matthews. So, we do see a trend where plans have in
850	certain instances included high-cost, high-rebate drugs on
851	their formularies even when lower cost alternatives are
852	available.
853	And the idea here is that the high-cost drug is going to
854	get the beneficiary into the coverage gap sooner than a lower
855	cost brand name drug, or a lower cost generic. And it is
856	above the coverage gap in the current construct where the
857	plan only has 15 percent liability for those costs.

858	And so, arguably, there are instances where the size of
859	the rebate for certain drugs can be so great as to even begin
860	to offset their 15 percent liability above that catastrophic
861	limit.
862	Mr. Walden. So, what is the effect for taxpayers, and
863	what is the effect for consumers for that?
864	Mr. Matthews. So, for taxpayers then the fastest
865	growing component of Medicare spending for Part D is the
866	reinsurance payments that the program makes to plans. And
867	these are payments that reflect plans' costs for these
868	extremely high-cost enrollees. But these payments are also
869	funded directly by the Medicare program.
870	So, the fact that these reinsurance payments have been
871	growing for 20 percent year over year for the last ten years
872	is detrimental to taxpayers. And to the extent that these
873	costs are reflected in the calculation of Part B premiums, it
874	is detrimental for the beneficiaries who are paying for these
875	premiums.
876	Mr. Walden. All right, thank you very much. I will
877	yield back, Madam Chair.
878	Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman. Yields back.
879	The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
880	California, my friend Congresswoman Matsui.

881 Ms. Matsui. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. 882 And thank you, Dr. Matthews for joining us today. While it is important to focus on lowering the price of 883 prescription drugs to patients and to ensure the 884 885 sustainability of the Medicare program, we can't lose site of the need to protect beneficiaries' access to necessary 886 887 medications. As you know, the Administration last fall 888 proposed changes to the protected class policy that would 889 allow Part D plan sponsors to add restrictions or otherwise 890 limit prescription medications in the six protected classes. 891 The protected class policy is an important safety net 892 for patients who absolutely need potentially life-saving 893 medications to treat a complex medical condition. 894 particularly concerned that changing protected class policy 895 will jeopardize Medicare beneficiaries' access to the full 896 range of medicines for treating mental illness. 897 For example, antidepressant medication impacts 898 individuals differently and, as such, can take time to find 899 the right treatment that works for any given individual. 900 earlier this month I wrote a letter to my colleagues to CMS 901 expressing this concern. 902 Dr. Matthews, I understand that MedPAC has recently 903 considered similar changes to two of the six protected

classes, including antidepressants. Given my concern around access for Medicare's most vulnerable beneficiaries, I am interested in your thoughts on how we can continue to ensure the availability of needed medications while making changes to protect the classes?

Mr. Matthews. Sure. Yes, ma'am, I'm happy to address that.

As part of our 2016 recommendations on Part D, we did recommend removing two categories of drugs from the protected classes, one of which was antidepressants. The second one was immunosuppresives used after transplant surgery.

The rationale here was that there do seem to be enough alternatives in those two categories that plans could be able to put together a formulary that accommodated the clinical needs of most beneficiaries needing those drugs without being constrained by having to cover every drug on those protected classes.

The Administration's proposal is a little bit different.

I don't think they have recommended eliminating any of the protected classes, but have proposed giving plans more ability to use utilization management within those classes.

Again, you know, the balance here is beneficiary access relative to plans' ability to negotiate with manufacturers

for price. And if the plan has to cover every single drug in 927 a protected class, they have virtually no leverage in order 928 to negotiate with a manufacturer. So, it is those tradeoffs 929 930 that led us to the recommendation. 931 The last thing I would say is we would, in either instance, in our recommendation or with respect to the 932 933 Administration's proposal, we would believe that there is a strong need for a well-functioning appeals process that 934 935 beneficiaries can avail themselves of. 936 Ms. Matsui. I agree. Yeah, that would be good. But on the other hand, you know, we have had experience 937 938 with people with mental illness. And in particular, as you know, the therapy involved there is very difficult to get the 939 940 right medication. And then to have to go back again to start 941 over since there we know that is not going to work anyway. 942 And I just really hope that whatever process you decide to 943 implement is really going to be very sensitive to that. Because we would hate to lose the ability for 944 945 individuals who already found a therapy to be able to 946 continue in some way. 947 Mr. Matthews. Yes. We are keenly aware of the unique nature of treatments for behavioral disorders. 948 949 Ms. Matsui. Okay. I want to talk a little bit about

out-of-pocket spending for beneficiaries in Medicare Part D.

And I am concerned about patient access issues created by the fact the Part D program does not currently have an out-of-pocket limit. It means that some seniors who have significant drug spending, often those with chronic diseases or those who are severely ill, will continue to pay a cost-sharing obligation even in the catastrophic phase, and even after spending thousands of dollars out of pocket.

I know that MedPAC has recommended reforming the Part D benefit to eliminate cost sharing above the out-of-pocket threshold. Can you explain MedPAC's recommendations to cap out-of-pocket expenses for Part D beneficiaries, and how this change might impact premiums and other aspects of the benefit design?

And I only have about 15 seconds here.

Mr. Matthews. Sure. So, we did indeed recommend in 2016 capping the beneficiary's financial obligation above the catastrophic phase. The motivation was that if the beneficiary is incurring that kind of cost, coinsurance is not a drag on inappropriate utilization but it is potentially punitive at that point from the beneficiary's financial perspective.

Ms. Matsui. Okay. I yield back my time. Thank you.

973 Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentlewoman. She yields back. I now would like to recognize the gentleman from 974 Illinois, Mr. Shimkus, for five minutes of questions. 975 976 Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to 977 thank you for having this hearing today. 978 Dr. Matthews, welcome. We appreciate your input. And it is very helpful. We just need to take action, and that is 979 980 what this hearing is. 981 I also appreciate your comments on trying to clarify the how is VA different. I know that is kind of out of your 982 window. But, that there is a formulary and so the formulary 983 984 is narrow, so even our veterans may not get the full scope of drugs available in our country because they are purchasing 985 986 and making contracts. And we always have to try to explain 987 that in this process because sometimes it gets lumped 988 together and say, well, why can't you do it that way? And I 989 guess if you have lower cost, that is good. But if you don't 990 get the drug, the blockbuster drug, then it is bad. So, then 991 there is, there is that balance. 992 I also appreciated, talking just Medicare D, what 993 benefit was provided to our seniors for health and 994 prescription drugs prior to Medicare D?

Mr. Matthews. There was no real outpatient prescription

995

996 drug benefit. 997 Mr. Shimkus. There was none. So, I mean, again, for, just for an instruction purpose, we wrestled with how to get 998 999 Medicare. In fact, a lot of conservative Republicans got 1000 beat up quite a bit on this because we expanded in essence an 1001 entitlement and mandatory spending program. But modern 1002 medicine said prescription drugs has to be part of the fix. I know the chairman has left, but we had some great 1003 1004 fights, and debates, and battles. And Chairman Pallone was 1005 most angry about the donut hole provisions which we placed in 1006 there for budgetary -- to make the numbers work. 1007 So, I was surprised when I met with a constituent 1008 because I don't follow this as closely as you all do, and we 1009 have a new world of drugs on the market prior to what we did in 2003. They are lifesaving drugs, they are biologics, they 1010 1011 are especially new blockbuster drugs are very, very 1012 expensive. 1013 So, I had a constituent who provided me with this, a 1014 biologic. It is actually ant -- let me look down there. 1015 What was it? Enzyme. Come on, come up here so you can tell All right, enzyme deficiency. So, this is at a cost a 1016 1017 year of \$348,000. 1018 So, then I was kind of going through how Medicare D got

1019	established. And I drew the donut hole. I said, you pay
1020	here, you fall into the donut hole, you have to pay it all.
1021	And then it was our intent that once you came out of the
1022	donut hole that you would be covered. So, I think some of
1023	your proposals are trying to address, well, you know, the
1024	answers to Doris, Congresswoman Matsui's concerns about end
1025	of out-of-pocket cost.
1026	And then I was surprised when he provided me information
1027	that the percentage cost. This is 22,000, 348,000 over a
1028	year, 22,000 a month. They are still on the hook for a
1029	percentage of that.
1030	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. Correct.
1031	Mr. Shimkus. So for those who were in that room in 2003
1032	thought that once they got out of the donut hole they had
1033	kind of gotten home free. That is not true, is it?
1034	Mr. Matthews. No, sir, it is not.
1035	Mr. Shimkus. Yeah, and it is not true for my
1036	constituent either. So, I appreciate him meeting me. We
1037	actually met in a bar, you know, as I was traveling through
1038	my district, which is very large. Yeah, we did have to have
1039	a few drinks after I heard that cost of that, they were
1040	having the burden.
1041	So, we need to address this, you know, this major

1042	expense. And if Medicare D is supposed to be an insurance
1043	plan and then there is a catastrophic portion, there is
1044	eventually a time when and I think that is your
1045	reinsurance provision and those other proposals, am I
1046	correct?
1047	Mr. Matthews. That's correct. Yes, sir.
1048	Mr. Shimkus. So, I just thank you for being here. It
1049	is my understanding that you are an independent agency and
1050	you advise us. So, I would hope, Madam Chairman, that we
1051	would take your counsel and try to address especially this
1052	end of the process because Medicare D does seniors pay in.
1053	I mean, so they are part of the solution. They are not just,
1054	it is just not all government solution because it is an
1055	insurance plan that they are partners with and they choose.
1056	We need to help them on the back end.
1057	So, with that I appreciate your time. Thank you, Madam
1058	Chairman. And my time has expired.
1059	Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman. Excellent questions.
1060	I now would like to recognize the gentleman from Oregon,
1061	Mr. Schrader, for five minutes of questions.
1062	Mr. Schrader. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, I appreciate
1063	it.
1064	Dr. Matthews, thanks I need some medication myself

1065 thank you for taking time to be here.

As you may or may not know, my State of Oregon is taking steps to increase the number of payments tied to performance in Medicaid. Specifically, they are using an 1115 waiver to work with our coordinated care organizations and network providers to create a plan to have a value-based payment by 2022. Other states are also trying to set up these arrangements.

Has MedPAC evaluated either in specific cases or more broadly whether Medicare may benefit from value-based payments and tying the reimbursement to actual outcomes?

What, if any, barriers are in the way for that?

Mr. Matthews. So, we are aware of the emergence of these types of value-based arrangements, both here in the United States and in European countries. It is my understanding that the evidence on the long-term effectiveness of these arrangements simply does not yet exist, that these are new enough that a broad base of evidence hasn't been generated to ascertain that they have, they can exercise the potential that the stakeholders believe is there.

With respect to Medicare, one potential impediment to the broad use of these sorts of value-based arrangements is

the voluntary nature of Part D. So, a plan may enter into a manufact -- an agreement with a manufacturer that is contingent on certain beneficiary outcomes that may not manifest themselves until after the lapse of a period of years. But Part D is a voluntary benefit, and a beneficiary can move from one plan to the next year after year. And so, a plan may not see the benefits of its investment in these arrangements for a particular enrollee.

So that is one potential logistical obstacle in Part D as currently designed.

Mr. Schrader. Good point.

With regard to the general Medicare population, you spoke in your testimony about the long-term beneficiaries disproportionally selecting brand drugs sometimes over generic, actually oftentimes brand over generic. What remedy for increasing utilization of generics by this population would you recommend? I know that there are administrations out there trying just to lower the cost of the brands or, excuse me, the generic to zero to make it appealing. What about increasing the cost of the brand? Your thoughts.

Mr. Matthews. So, we have gone on record as recommending that even low income or beneficiaries receiving the low income subsidy should be given incentives to use

1111	generics when they are available and clinically appropriate.
1112	As you just mentioned, those incentives can take one of
1113	two forms: one is zero copayments or zero financial liability
1114	for generics; the second would be some nominal financial
1115	liability for the use of brand name drugs when generics are
1116	available. And we think that even low income beneficiaries
1117	should have to make those kinds of decisions with respect to
1118	the therapies that they and their clinicians decide on.
1119	Mr. Schrader. So you don't have an opinion as to
1120	whether just reducing one or increasing?
1121	Mr. Matthews. Either would achieve the goal of
1122	increasing benefi low income beneficiaries' use of
1123	generics.
1124	Mr. Schrader. All right. Very good, thank you.
1125	With that, I yield back.
1126	Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman. He yields back.
1127	I now would like to recognize the gentleman from
1128	Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie.
1129	Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
1130	meeting.
1131	And thank you for being here. Doing a good job for your
1132	good job even though it is your first time. I almost said
1133	a good job for your first job. But a good job. I appreciate

1134 it very much. 1135 And, unfortunately, we should coordinate better with my neighbor in the hallway Mr. Schrader because he asked almost 1136 word for word one of the questions I was going to ask. So, 1137 1138 let me get to the valued-based. That is interesting to me. 1139 But so, are you supportive of transparency tools like 1140 realtime prescription benefit check that could help beneficiaries understand the cost of their prescribed 1141 1142 medications before they leave the doctor's office? 1143 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. We have been supportive of clinicians' use of electronic tools like realtime benefit 1144 1145 check. 1146 Mr. Guthrie. So, what policies do you think we should 1147 develop to encourage use of these policies, of these tools? 1148 Mr. Matthews. I would need to think about that, with 1149 all due respect. It is my understanding that the technology 1150 does exist with respect to currently available electronic 1151 health records. But the issue is getting the clinician to 1152 actually purchase the requisite models or modules to do the 1153 realtime benefit check, and providing incentives for 1154 clinicians to use those. 1155 The commission does not have a specific proposal in 1156 order to do that.

1157 Mr. Guthrie. Okay. Thank you. And changing gears, since Mr. Schrader took my thunder, 1158 1159 I am told that the physician charge, I am told that a physician charges, that a physician charges per administering 1160 1161 drugs are twice as much in hospitals compared to doctors' 1162 office. This drives up Medicare costs but also drives up 1163 cost-sharing for the patients. Can more be done to address this through site neutral payment reform? 1164 1165 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. I believe there is more that 1166 can be done. As you know, the commission has been concerned about the incentives or the undesirable incentives that occur 1167 1168 with respect to the differential for a clinician's services 1169 in the physician office versus the hospital outpatient 1170 department. And we have made recommendations to standardize 1171 those payments across settings. 1172 Yet, nevertheless, we think that those incentives still 1173 exist and that there are potential broader remedies that 1174 could be contemplated. 1175 Mr. Guthrie. Okay, thank you. And, again, thanks for 1176 being here today, and holding the hearing. And I yield back. Mr. Bucshon. Will the gentleman yield for a few 1177 1178 seconds. 1179 Mr. Guthrie. Yes, I will yield the remainder of my time

1180 to Mr. Bucshon. 1181 Yeah, yeah. Mr. Bucshon. Dr. Bucshon. 1182 Mr. Guthrie. 1183 Mr. Bucshon. Yeah. I just want to make a brief comment 1184 on what he was talking about about the patients knowing up 1185 front what prices drugs are. 1186 When I was in practice, if I was going to prescribe 1187 something I knew might cost a lot I actually checked myself 1188 personally before I would prescribe it for the patient, just to make sure. But I do think in today's electronic world 1189 1190 that we should, physicians should be able to determine that 1191 up front. And sometimes, depending on the patient, that may 1192 very well make you make different decisions on what the 1193 options are because if the out-of-pocket is going to be real 1194 high to the patient there might be therapeutic alternatives. 1195 So, I do think we can get to a place where electronic 1196 records can provide that information at a minimum to the 1197 provider. I think it is when you go to the consumer it is 1198 more confusing, but for the provider I think that can, that 1199 could help, so. Yeah, it could pop up on the screen for 1200 example when you go to provide, when you go to send an 1201 electronic prescription. 1202 So, I yield.

1203 Mr. Guthrie. Thanks. I yield back. 1204 Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman. And he yields. 1205 I now would like to recognize the gentleman from California, Dr. Ruiz, for five minutes of questioning. 1206 1207 Mr. Ruiz. Thank you. 1208 Dr. Matthews, I appreciate the position that the 1209 commission is in trying to make recommendations that balance the need to cut down on health care costs while also ensuring 1210 1211 that patients are getting the care that they need. And I 1212 know that patient care is important to you. In your written testimony you identify one of the 1213 1214 commission's goals is "achieving a Medicare program that 1215 ensures beneficiary access to high quality, well-coordinated care." 1216 1217 Last November, CMS proposed a rule that would allow 1218 Medicare Advantage plans to use step therapy for Medicare 1219 Part B drugs. And, while I understand that step therapy can play an important role in reducing health care costs, it 1220 1221 often does not take into account a patient's medical history, 1222 like whether they have tried the medication previously and 1223 failed under a different insurance plan. 1224 Fred Sangiorgio, one of my constituents from La Quinta, 1225 California, suffers from psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis

and is going through step therapy right now. He has been diagnosed most of his adult life and has tried several treatments over the years. Despite the fact that he already tried one treatment that didn't work, he is currently being forced to go through a similar treatment that his doctor knows won't be effective.

Instead of being able to prescribe an alternative treatment that she thinks will be more effective, his doctor has to wait for this drug to fail, too, despite the fact that both of them know that what is going -- what is going to happen.

That is why I have introduced legislation with my friend Congressman Wenstrup, a fellow physician, that would help protect the doctor/patient relationship and help get patients the care that they need. The Safe Step Act creates a list of exemptions that will allow patients to bypass step therapy if their doctor knows that the treatment will not be successful, as is the case with Fred.

As a physician, I want to ensure that all step therapy protocols also include safeguards to help ensure that patients aren't forced to have to try a treatment that their provider knows is not likely to work for them, or even to take a drug that may have already failed for them in the

1249	past.
1250	So, can you outline some safeguards that CMS can put
1251	into place to protect the patients from unnecessary and
1252	potential harmful treatments?
1253	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. So, again, the commission has
1254	gone on record as supporting giving plans more flexibility to
1255	appropriately use these management tools. We do understand
1256	that the circumstances of every patient is unique and that we
1257	would not support putting a patient through some of these
1258	things, like step therapy, when the clinician knows that they
1259	are not going to be effective for a given patient. And,
1260	therefore, we have said that the greater use of these tools
1261	has to be accompanied by a very robust and effective system
1262	of grievances and appeals whereby a clinician can request an
1263	expedited
1264	Mr. Ruiz. So what are some of these exceptions that you
1265	would propose to safeguard patient access?
1266	Mr. Matthews. So, if the clinician is able to document
1267	that the patient has previously failed on a therapy that is
1268	required by a plan's formulary or step therapy or
1269	Mr. Ruiz. And what does "failed" mean to you?
1270	Mr. Matthews. That the patient's clinical condition has
1271	not responded to the treatment that is being required by the

1272 plan. 1273 Mr. Ruiz. Does a lack of compliance due to cumbersome 1274 regiments like a, you know, every four hour treatment and, 1275 therefore, that doesn't fit that person's life or work 1276 schedule, would that be considered failure to you? 1277 Mr. Matthews. I do not have the clinical basis to 1278 answer that question, with all due respect. And the commission hasn't opined at that level of detail. 1279 1280 Mr. Ruiz. Right. In my medical opinion, when it is a 1281 compliance issue it is usually a failure in the system to 1282 provide the best treatment and follow-up for that patient. 1283 It is not the patient's fault per se, which is normally what 1284 happens in the medical world. 1285 So, what other safeguards could we think of that would 1286 provide these exceptions so that we can preserve the 1287 patient's and the physician's judgment in getting them the 1288 medication that is best for that patient instead of putting 1289 them through a rigorous bureaucratic step process in order to 1290 save the company money? 1291 Mr. Matthews. Again, if I could ask for the 1292 dispensation to think about that and follow up. 1293 Mr. Ruiz. Okay. What's the MedPAC strategy to both 1294 monitor beneficiary impact and to ensure CMS institutes

1295	appropriate safeguards, including those that are lined with
1296	number of state laws which serve as models for the Safe Step
1297	Act?
1298	Mr. Matthews. So, we believe that the Medicare program
1299	is currently monitoring beneficiaries' appeals under Part D.
1300	There are a number of steps that patients and their
1301	clinicians can go through. And it is my understanding that
1302	the majority of those appeals are indeed adjudicated in favor
1303	of the patients when clinically warranted.
1304	So, the agency is indeed monitoring whether or not
1305	beneficiaries' access to medications under Part D as being
1306	unduly compromised.
1307	Mr. Ruiz. Thank you.
1308	Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
1309	I now would like to recognize the gentleman from
1310	Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for five minutes of questioning.
1311	Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. Appreciate it
1312	very much. Thanks for holding this very important hearing.
1313	I appreciate it.
1314	Dr. Matthews, with Florida's traditionally higher senior
1315	population, lowering prescription drug prices, as you can
1316	imagine, and Medicare is very important to me. As noted in
1317	MedPAC comments on the International Pricing Index, or IPI

1318 for short, last year the drug value program recommended previously by MedPAC would give vendors tools to negotiate 1319 1320 lower prices. 1321 Under the Administration's IPI proposal they don't 1322 include these tools. So it seems like, instead, the 1323 government is just setting the price directly. Am I correct 1324 in concluding that MedPAC's proposal is more market-based than the Administration's? 1325 1326 Mr. Matthews. I would not want to comment on whether or 1327 not the competing proposals are more market based, one 1328 relative to the other. We did identify a number of potential 1329 logistical issues with respect to the Administration's 1330 proposal that we believe would make it very difficult to 1331 implement. And these range from things such as the one you 1332 just mentioned, that the vendor would not have any tools, 1333 such as a formulary, or other mechanisms by which to 1334 negotiate with manufacturers. 1335 The vendor under the Administration's model would take 1336 title to the drugs, but perhaps not actual physical 1337 possession. And then, lastly, the vendor would be paid at a rate 1338 1339 determined by Medicare based on the international price 1340 comparison, whether or not they were able to obtain that rate

1341	on the market or not. And we identified a number of issues
1342	that would affect the ability to even calculate that
1343	international sales rate, given available data and given the
1344	idiosyncratic arrangements between manufacturers and, you
1345	know, other countries' governments.
1346	So, we think there are some substantial implementation
1347	difficulties with respect to the IPI proposal that do not
1348	present themselves under our proposal, which would give the
1349	vendor more ability to negotiate on the basis of being able
1350	to help drive manufacturers's volume.
1351	Ms. Eshoo. Excuse me, Doctor. May I please, I just
1352	learned that your voice is not carrying well on T.V. So, can
1353	you bring your microphone much closer.
1354	Mr. Matthews. Sure.
1355	Ms. Eshoo. And then maybe the staff hearing me will
1356	come back in and let us know if you can be heard.
1357	Mr. Matthews. Thank you.
1358	Ms. Eshoo. Thank you.
1359	Mr. Matthews. Sure.
1360	I am sorry, so I was indicating that under our proposal
1361	that some of the difficulties engendered by the IPI proposal
1362	would be mitigated. And we believe that it would have
1363	greater potential to reduce spending for Part B drugs.

1364	Mr. Bilirakis. Very good.
1365	I know there are examples in the market where
1366	arbitration is used, such as baseball. I am a big baseball
1367	fan. But developing breakthrough medicine is a lot different
1368	from developing starting pitching. And legislating a
1369	government-defined arbitration process is a lot different
1370	from negotiating one through a players' union.
1371	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir.
1372	Mr. Bilirakis. Are there examples of binding
1373	arbitration between being used in health care? And do any of
1374	these examples involve setting prices at a national level or
1375	just resolving disputes at an individual level?
1376	Ms. Eshoo. Move your microphone even closer please.
1377	Yeah, pull it right up.
1378	Mr. Matthews. This is, yes, this is not a natural thing
1379	for me to be doing. So I apologize.
1380	Ms. Eshoo. That is all right. We will guide you. It
1381	is just a microphone; get it as close as possible so
1382	Mr. Matthews. All right.
1383	Ms. Eshoo anyone in the country that is listening
1384	in can actually hear you.
1385	Mr. Matthews. Yeah. That is not helping but I will
1386	Ms. Eshoo. Okay.

1387 [Laughter.] Mr. Matthews. We will see. 1388 So, we are unaware of the use of baseball arbitration in 1389 1390 the way we have proposed it for Part B. 1391 Mr. Bilirakis. Can you describe how you have proposed 1392 it, the arbitration? 1393 Mr. Matthews. Right. So, so as I mentioned both in my written testimony and in my oral remarks, one of the 1394 1395 vulnerabilities of the Medicare program is that it has 1396 little, if any, ability to influence the price that the 1397 manufacturer sets for a product and, therefore, the price 1398 that Medicare pays. And we believe that binding arbitration 1399 would give the program a means of influencing that price by 1400 bringing the manufacturer to the table with their absolute 1401 best offer for a new product. 1402 And then the secretary would be able to make a competing 1403 offer if he or she did not think that the evidence supported 1404 that manufacturer's price. And that this would be distinct 1405 from a scenario where the secretary is negotiating directly 1406 with manufacturers for price in that only certain drugs that 1407 met a criteria defined under statute or regulation would 1408 trigger this binding arbitration process. 1409 But currently the Medicare program has virtually no

1410	means whatsoever to influence price. And as I have said in
1411	my testimony, under both B and D price is one of the major
1412	drivers of Medicare spending for drugs.
1413	Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. Thank you.
1414	I yield back, Madam Chair.
1415	Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
1416	And I now would like to recognize the gentlewoman from
1417	New Hampshire, Congresswoman Kuster.
1418	Ms. Kuster. Thank you very much. I am delighted to be
1419	here. And thank you for your discussion. It is actually
1420	very, very helpful on a complicated topic.
1421	So, in New Hampshire the nearly 300,000 Medicare
1422	beneficiaries, and most of them, many of them do have
1423	Medicare Part D for complete drug coverage. But the prices
1424	that Granite Staters are facing for prescription drugs are,
1425	to say it bluntly, unacceptable and, frankly, unsustainable.
1426	They are unsustainable for aging communities that rely on
1427	Medicare to be there for them when they turn 65, and for the
1428	taxpayers who hard-earned dollars go toward the different
1429	payment mechanisms that you have walked us through today.
1430	So, I am going to cut to the chase. I want to
1431	understand specifically on the "buy and bill" program.
1432	Under the current Part B system, a provider is

1433	reimbursed at 106 percent of the average sales price,
1434	regardless of the actual price that they pay for the drug.
1435	And so my question is some providers may be getting the drug
1436	at a price below the average, and it is possible that some at
1437	a price above the average.
1438	Could you explain the original intent behind the 100
1439	percent plus 6 add-on payment? And what information is
1440	available on the provider's actual acquisition cost, what
1441	they pay for the drug?
1442	Mr. Matthews. Okay, sure. I will try to answer without
1443	deigning congressional intent behind the 6 percent add-on.
1444	But, the answer to the question, in all candor, is not
1445	clear. There are a number of competing alternative
1446	explanations for 6 percent. One is that the 6 percent helps
1447	compensate clinicians and providers for the costs of
1448	administering the drug. But, as I mentioned earlier,
1449	Medicare pays the clinician separately for that.
1450	Ms. Kuster. But they get a separate payment for that?
1451	Mr. Matthews. That is correct.
1452	Ms. Kuster. Right.
1453	Mr. Matthews. So, I don't think that explanation is
1454	quite right.
1455	Another explanation is that the 6 percent compensates

1456	for the provider's costs related to handling and storing the
1457	drug or waste that occurs during the administration of the
1458	drug. But, again, under both the outpatient perspective
1459	payment system and the physician fee schedule there are
1460	components of those payments that reflect providers' costs of
1461	basically running the operation. So I don't think that is -
1462	_
1463	Ms. Kuster. The normal overhead.
1464	Mr. Matthews. That is, that is exactly right.
1465	Ms. Kuster. Exactly.
1466	Mr. Matthews. Yes, ma'am.
1467	And so the most compelling explanation, from my
1468	perspective, is that as you just pointed out, not every
1469	purchaser is able to get the drug at the average price. Some
1470	are paying more, some are paying less. And to the extent
1471	that volume is driving a provider's ability to obtain a good
1472	price, some small, independent practitioners, rural
1473	physicians, small hospitals, may not be getting quite a good
1474	a deal as larger health systems. And so the 6 percent add-on
1475	could be reflecting the relative purchasing provider base
1476	power based on volume.
1477	Ms. Kuster. So, I am glad you brought up volume. And

my goal is to have the lowest price for the senior and the

1478

lowest price for the taxpayer. And I think right now it is

safe to say seniors are paying too much, taxpayers are paying

too much.

So, my question is has MedPAC ever examined the impact

on the cost of medications to beneficiaries in the Medicare

on the cost of medications to beneficiaries in the Medicare program by authorizing Health and Human Service secretary to negotiate a volume discount on prescription drugs? And have you ever provided recommendations? Could you tell us?

I just don't understand, everywhere else. I have sat for six years on the Veterans' Affairs Committee. I know what federal employees. I know what Walgreen's. And my constituents don't understand why wouldn't we have a volume discount for the purchase of medication under Medicare?

Mr. Matthews. The commission has not taken a position on this issue, nor have we made any recommendations.

Ms. Kuster. So, we don't know, it could bring down the cost for both the taxpayers and seniors?

Mr. Matthews. I don't know that I would opine on that myself because the notion of volume discount in some ways raises the question of the secretary negotiating with manufacturers and basically saying, I, the Medicare program, am going to guarantee a certain amount of volume of your drug and, therefore, you need to give me this volume discount or

1502	this lower price.
1503	And, again, the commission has not taken a position with
1504	respect to the secretary's ability to influence price through
1505	direct negotiation.
1506	Ms. Kuster. I would simply say, in every other aspect
1507	that is how we bring down the price is negotiating a volume
1508	discount.
1509	So, I very much appreciate your candor.
1510	Mr. Matthews. Sure.
1511	Ms. Kuster. And I yield back.
1512	Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back.
1513	I now would like to recognize the gentleman from
1514	Georgia, Mr. Carter, for five minutes of questioning.
1515	Mr. Carter. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And
1516	thank you, Dr. Matthews, for being here. And thank you for
1517	the work that you in leading MedPAC and helping and doing
1518	your best to keep prices down, as well as providing the best
1519	services that we can to the recipients of Medicare. It is
1520	extremely important.
1521	Earlier this month in this committee, in a bipartisan
1522	fashion, I was able to pass legislation that I sponsored,
1523	bipartisan legislation, along with Representative Gianforte,
1524	Representative O'Halleran, Representative Welch, called the

1525 Payment Commission Data Act. 1526 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. 1527 Mr. Carter. Which is going to allow MedPAC, as you 1528 know, to be able to get data relating to prescription drug 1529 pricing. And you in turn will be able to use that data to 1530 make recommendations to us here in Congress. 1531 Can you just comment on that firsthand on how that may 1532 be able to help you? 1533 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. And before I do, I would want 1534 to express on behalf of the commission my appreciation to you 1535 and the other cosponsors of this legislation. 1536 One of the ways that the commission has been hamstrung in terms of being able to evaluate the effects of the various 1537 1538 rebate structures on the Medicare program and its 1539 beneficiaries is we do not have access to that level of 1540 granular data with respect to rebates on a prescription by 1541 prescription or drug by drug basis. 1542 And so, for example, when we commented on the Office of 1543 Inspector General's recent proposal to eliminate rebates in 1544 the Medicare program we were only able to evaluate that 1545 proposal through its aggregate impacts on the program, on beneficiaries and manufacturers. We simply did not have the 1546 1547 level of detail in order to be able to assess it would affect

1548	this group of beneficiaries who are taking this class of
1549	medications for this variety of conditions. And so, having
1550	this more granular data on rebates would help us do those
1551	kind of analyses and help inform the kinds of deliberations
1552	that the committee is having on a regular basis.
1553	Mr. Carter. Right. And I certainly think both of us
1554	would be remiss if we did not mention that that information
1555	is only going to go to you.
1556	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir.
1557	Mr. Carter. You are the only ones who are going to see
1558	it. It is not we get it, it is proprietary information,
1559	but it is not going to be released to the public, it will
1560	only go to the commission.
1561	Mr. Matthews. That is correct, sir. MedPAC has a
1562	sterling track record in terms of
1563	Mr. Carter. Right.
1564	Mr. Matthews handling proprietary and sensitive
1565	data.
1566	Mr. Carter. Right.
1567	I want to ask you about the DIR fees. You are familiar
1568	with DIR fees and you are familiar with what the
1569	Administration, what Health and Human Services, CMS
1570	specifically, has proposed in changing the rules so that, so

1571 that DIR fees or discounts will go directly at the point of sale, as you mentioned earlier. But there were two things 1572 that you mentioned in your letter to the Administration, or 1573 to HHS, about DIR fees, first of all, that DIR fees had grown 1574 from \$229 million in 2013 to \$4 billion in 2017. 1575 1576 Mr. Matthews. Sure. 1577 Mr. Carter. \$229 million to \$4 billion. 1578 And, of course, for those people who don't know, DIR 1579 fees are essentially clawback fees that go to the, the PBMs 1580 put on, placed on the pharmacies. You also mentioned that the amount of the DIR fees that 1581 1582 the plan sponsors were recouping actually exceeded what they 1583 had proposed and what they had really had projected. Can you 1584 comment on or explain what that disparity might mean for cost 1585 sharing? 1586 Mr. Matthews. So, yes. What the short answer is that 1587 this means beneficiaries at the point of sale are paying a 1588 much greater amount in cost sharing than they should be 1589 relative to the effective transaction price between the 1590 manufacturer and the plan. Mr. Carter. Exactly. Exactly. But and I know that 1591

MedPAC has put out some different solution to the DIR fees,

but the point is that you agree that DIR fees are a problem?

1592

1593

Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir, that is correct.

1594

1595 Mr. Carter. Okay, good. 1596 Very quickly in what little time I have left, of course 1597 one of the things that we've been talking on this committee 1598 and in Energy and Commerce, and specifically on the O&I 1599 committee has been insulin pricing. And I just wanted you to 1600 comment very quickly that I understand there is a lot of 1601 variability in the different plans on how they cover insulin, 1602 but can you, can you explain how the Medicare plans cover 1603 insulin, particularly for those patients who are in the donut 1604 hole? 1605 Mr. Matthews. If I could get you to ask the question 1606 just slightly differently? 1607 Mr. Carter. Well, in other words, I know the different Medicare Part B plans cover it in different ways. But making 1608 1609 it affordable, making it accessible is something we are very 1610 concerned with, particularly on this committee. How can we 1611 do that? How can those plans do that in a better way? 1612 Mr. Matthews. Again, our recommendation to restructure 1613 the Part D benefit would mitigate the incentives for plans to use these high-cost, high-rebate drugs. And insulin is one 1614 1615 example of those kinds of things. And by better aligning the 1616 plans' incentives it would potentially reduce the influence

1617	of DIR on the cost that the beneficiary faces.
1618	Mr. Carter. Right. Again I want to thank you for your
1619	work on transparency and accountability within the system,
1620	particularly with the third party, the pharmacy benefit
1621	managers, the middleman, that is what is going to help us.
1622	And, you know, transparency is the best disinfectant out
1623	there, and sunlight is, and that is why we need it so bad.
1624	So, thank you for your work on this, and I yield back.
1625	Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
1626	I now would like to recognize the gentleman from North
1627	Carolina, George Butterfield. And happy birthday to you
1628	again.
1629	Mr. Butterfield. I have been multitasking today and I
1630	don't have any questions.
1631	Ms. Eshoo. You don't?
1632	Mr. Butterfield. If you can believe that.
1633	Ms. Eshoo. Isn't that something.
1634	Mr. Butterfield. Yes.
1635	Ms. Eshoo. Well, a lot of good ones have been asked, so
1636	stay tuned.
1637	All right. Well, with that we will move to the
1638	gentlewoman from Delaware, Ms. Blunt Rochester, for five
1639	minutes of questioning.

Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And I would also like to thank you, Dr. Matthews, I am trying to speak into the mike now I am cognizant of it.

Today's hearing is an opportunity for the subcommittee to continue our bipartisan work on lowering prescription drug costs by turning our attention to how skyrocketing prices are impacting Medicare Part B and D. And it couldn't happen at a more important time. Prescription drug spending accounts for nearly one dollar out of every five spent on Medicare and, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, was 19 percent of overall Medicare spending in 2016.

The Office of the Actuary at CMS found that the national health expenditures will continue to increase by an annual average of 5.5 percent until 2027. These spending trends mean that it is not just the Federal Government that is paying more but Medicare beneficiaries. And in my state that means growing costs for the almost 200,000 Medicare beneficiaries.

Dr. Matthews, I would like to discuss Part B's, Medicare Part B's low income subsidy which helps provide beneficiaries with limited incomes assistance with their Part D premiums and out-of-pocket expenses.

In 2018, 12.5 million beneficiaries with incomes at or

1663	below 100 percent of the federal poverty level received
1664	federal assistance. And in Delaware, 23 percent of
1665	beneficiaries received the low income subsidy. However,
1666	MedPAC has found that relative to other Part D enrollees, a
1667	higher proportion of LIS enrollees use brand name drugs.
1668	Can you explain why this is happening?
1669	Mr. Matthews. Okay. The dominant hypothesis that has
1670	guided our thinking here is that the low income beneficiary
1671	whose costs are heavily subsidized is not as sensitive to
1672	cost sharing or the price of the drugs that they take
1673	relative to a beneficiary who is paying, you know, the full
1674	co-insurance and their full out-of-pocket liability. And so,
1675	given the choice between a brand name drug and a generic,
1676	many Medicare patients who regard generics as not as good, a
1677	low income beneficiary who is facing zero or minimal cost
1678	sharing is going to opt for the brand name when it is
1679	available.
1680	Ms. Blunt Rochester. Right. Opt for the one that they
1681	rationally think is the better
1682	Mr. Matthews. Yes.
1683	Ms. Blunt Rochester product.
1684	Additionally, MedPAC found that in 2016, about 8 percent
1685	of Part D enrollees reached the out-of-pocket threshold. And

of that 8 percent of high cost enrollees, over 70 percent were LIS beneficiaries. And given that it is the Medicare program that pays the largest share of costs out of -- above the out-of-pocket threshold, I am concerned that plans may be structuring their benefits in ways that shift costs to Medicare for these, these enrollees in order to shield plans from risk.

Does MedPAC share these concerns?

Mr. Matthews. Our concerns are more with, are even larger than that, not limited just to the low income beneficiaries. But, again, given the growth in the cost-based reinsurance payments for all Part D enrollees, we believe that is an extremely pressing problem for the program. And while in the earlier phases of the Part D benefit LIS enrollees did reach the catastrophic phase at faster rates and in greater proportions, in recent years it is the non-LIS population who is now hitting that cap at much higher rates.

Ms. Blunt Rochester. I know one of the things that you discussed before were the incentives, you know, to incentivize beneficiaries to pick a cheaper alternative. Can you talk about the options that you gave, are these evidence-based? Where did these ideas come from? How do you know

1709	they will work? You had, you listed, like, zero copayments,
1710	you talked about nominal financial incentive. Can you talk
1711	about where you got that from and why you think it will work?
1712	Mr. Matthews. Yeah, with permission, I would like to be
1713	able to follow up.
1714	Ms. Blunt Rochester. Great.
1715	I appreciate MedPAC's thoughtful analysis on this issue
1716	and so many issues within the Medicare program. Low income
1717	Part D beneficiaries on tight incomes, there are many of
1718	them, and we must be doing all we can to ensure that they
1719	also have access to the medications that they need, while
1720	ensuring that there are not perverse incentives that keep
1721	drug prices high.
1722	I thank you and I yield back.
1723	Mr. Matthews. Thank you.
1724	Mr. Butterfield.[Presiding.] Thank you, Ms. Blunt
1725	Rochester.
1726	The gentlelady from California, Ms. Barragan, is
1727	recognized for five minutes.
1728	Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
1729	I want to follow up on the questioning from one of my
1730	colleagues on Medicare Part D negotiating. I know that you
1731	indicated that MedPAC has not taken a position on that. We

had a hearing a few weeks ago, we had the drug manufacturers come in and PBMs come in. I asked them if they were for or against a proposal to have Medicare negotiate. And they were against it. Not surprising to many, concerned about profits and so on and so forth.

I am really glad to see in the committee that we are working on a bipartisan basis to bring down the price of prescription drugs. But I, having heard from my colleagues who sit on other committees for the VA, and everything I have read, it seems to me that -- and certainly hearing from you that you have no means to influence price -- it seems to me that if that were lifted, it would actually provide some leverage for us to bring down the cost of prescription drugs to the American people.

Has MedPAC done any type of study on how much money the American people would save if Medicare had the ability to negotiate drug prices?

Mr. Matthews. MedPAC has not done its own independent assessment of the viability of direct negotiation between the secretary and manufacturers.

When others, such as our colleagues at CBO, have looked at this issue they have determined that without the secretary having very, very strong leverage, such as Medicare coverage

or Medicare payment, or other alternatives that have been proposed related to things outside of my purview such as patent changes, that the secretary is unlikely to achieve substantial savings through direct negotiation without being able to use those kinds of very strong negotiating tactics.

Ms. Barragan. Can Medicare, rather can MedPAC do a study on this so that Congress has a report to look at and to look at these factors that you are discussing? Will MedPAC commit to doing something like that?

Mr. Matthews. We cold potentially look at some of the issues that would pertain to a direct negotiation scenario. So, you know, for example would this be across-the-board all drugs, all manufacturers? Does the agency have the resources to conduct these kinds of evaluations? What the evidence base is for the secretary's ability to negotiate a given price? We could look at those sorts of issues in a qualitative way.

I don't know that we would have the capacity to or the desire to second guess our colleagues at CBO with respect to calculating potential savings.

Ms. Barragan. Okay. Well, anything you could provide to Congress could be helpful, especially because this has been a bipartisan issue on a bipartisan basis, seems like a

1778 way to move forward. So, given that you do, you work on a 1779 bipartisan basis --1780 Mr. Matthews. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Barragan. -- I think any information will be 1781 1782 helpful. Thank you for that. 1783 I want to chat quickly about the issue of minority 1784 health disparities. Across this country, you know, people 1785 based on race are treated differently in our health care 1786 system, we have different health impacts and outcomes. For 1787 example, HIV diagnosis rate among Hispanic men is more than three times the HIV diagnosis rate among non-Hispanic white 1788 1789 African Americans are also more than twice as likely as whites to be diagnosed with and die from blood cancer and 1790 1791 multiple melanoma. 1792 My district is majority minority. It is about 80 percent Latino/African American. I have the highest rate of 1793 1794 diabetes than any other congressional district in the State 1795 of California. And we touched a little bit upon low income 1796 communities and how Medicare actually has low income 1797 subsidies for patients. But the annual income is pretty low. I think it is about \$18,735. In California it is easy to 1798 miss that a little bit. And they are not qualified. 1799 1800 And my concern is the connection between costs and the

1801	continuing impacts and effects on minority health
1802	disparities. Has MedPAC or CMS done any type of study to
1803	determine whether minority communities have similar outcomes
1804	from the Medicare Part D program as non-minority communities?
1805	Mr. Matthews. Not to the best of my knowledge.
1806	Ms. Barragan. Is that something you could do? I know
1807	you mentioned you do a lot of, you look at tradeoff and
1808	balances. But, you know, when we are talking about
1809	communities of color, racial health disparities is an issue.
1810	There shouldn't be really a tradeoff or balance with their
1811	health.
1812	Mr. Matthews. Understood. What is outlined here is a
1813	fairly broad endeavor though. And with, again with all due
1814	respect, if you could grant me the leeway to go back and talk
1815	to my staff about what we can and can do with or can and
1816	can't do with the resources that we have available to us we
1817	would certainly be willing to take a look at this.
1818	Ms. Barragan. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
1819	Mr. Butterfield. Thank you. The gentleman from Montana
1820	is recognized for five minutes.
1821	Mr. Gianforte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1822	Okay, thank you. Drug prices in the Medicare program
1823	keep rising and it is making it tougher for seniors in

Montana to afford their prescriptions. Dr. Matthews, last
August several members of the committee wrote to MedPAC and
asked the commission to examine the trend of hospital
consolidation and how much consolidation increases the costs
to Medicare, the Medicare program and beneficiaries,
including the costs of prescription drugs. So, I want to
focus on this issue today.

Since we are discussing prescription drug prices, can you please update us on MedPAC's findings, specifically the impact of hospital consolidation and acquisition of physician practices on the cost of prescription drugs to the Medicare program and seniors' out-of-pocket expenses?

Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. So, I don't have any update with respect to work we have currently underway in response to the most recent request. But as you know, a couple of years back we did a chapter in a June report looking at the effects of consolidation on Medicare spending, and looked at the impacts of both vertical integration where different levels of the health care system form single entities or horizontal integration such as where all cardiologists integrate under a single organization.

And so both of those types of consolidation do have the potential to increase spending for the Medicare program.

1847	Mr. Gianforte. So, that request that was made, the work
1848	is still ongoing?
1849	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir, that is correct.
1850	Mr. Gianforte. Okay.
1851	Mr. Matthews. And we anticipate starting to roll that
1852	out in the fall of this year.
1853	Mr. Gianforte. Okay, thank you.
1854	How do significant payment differences for identical
1855	medical services performed in Medicare at hospital outpatient
1856	departments versus independent physician practices impact
1857	seniors' out-of-pocket costs for Part B drugs?
1858	Mr. Matthews. It has the potential to substantially
1859	impact their out-of-pocket costs. But I use the word
1860	"potential" deliberately. And the reason I do that is
1861	because most Medicare beneficiaries in fee-for-service
1862	Medicare do have some secondary coverage. They are dual-
1863	eligibles, they have employer-sponsored wrap-around
1864	insurance, or they purchase Medigap.
1865	And so, to some extent they are insulated from the
1866	direct effects of these payment differentials across
1867	settings. But nonetheless, all Medicare beneficiaries are
1868	experiencing these effects through higher Part D premiums.
1869	And those beneficiaries who elect to purchase Medigap are

1870	paying higher Medigap premiums as a result.
1871	Mr. Gianforte. Okay. And has MedPAC made any
1872	recommendations to address this differential?
1873	Mr. Matthews. We have. It's been several years now
1874	where we identified a set of services meeting certain
1875	criteria: if they are majority provided in physicians'
1876	offices, they are majority not associated with emergency
1877	care, and identified services that are appropriate candidates
1878	for a Medicare site mutual payment policy.
1879	Mr. Gianforte. Okay. And if Congress required Medicare
1880	to pay the same amount for services regardless of where they
1881	are performed, would seniors' out-of-pocket prescription drug
1882	costs decrease? And what effect would it have on Medicare
1883	overall costs?
1884	Mr. Matthews. Off the top of my head I could not
1885	venture an answer with respect to the effects on their drug
1886	costs. It is something we could think about.
1887	Mr. Gianforte. Okay. So that is something you could
1888	look into additionally. Because this is the concern we hear
1889	back home is
1890	Mr. Matthews. Understood.
1891	Mr. Gianforte the overall cost, and prescription
1892	drugs area big piece of that. So, we very much appreciate

1893	your, your help to
1894	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir.
1895	Mr. Gianforte chart a path for us.
1896	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir.
1897	Mr. Gianforte. And I thank you for your testimony
1898	today. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
1899	Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
1900	The gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Kelly, is recognized
1901	for five minutes.
1902	Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Dr. Matthews, thank
1903	you for being here, and thank you for your testimony and
1904	sharing MedPAC's work on these important issues.
1905	As you point out in your testimony, there are a handful
1906	of expensive drugs driving spending in the Part D program,
1907	with consumers responsible for significant out-of-pocket
1908	costs. The top ten highest expenditure drugs accounted for
1909	about 43 percent of Part D drug spending in 2017. And all of
1910	these project products, excuse me, are biologics. Some of
1911	these drugs have competitors and others do not.
1912	I would like to learn more about the impact a biosimilar
1913	entry into the market had to date on the price of the
1914	originator biologics driving costs in Part D. You have
1915	shared what drugs a program is spending the most money on and

the conditions these drugs treat. But how many of the top
ten highest expenditure drugs in Part D face competition from
a biosimilar?

Mr. Matthews. As I recall, there are two products out of that top ten list that have biosimilar competitors. And the biosimilars have not had a substantial impact on the price that Medicare pays for the originator biologics. In part, this probably reflects the way Medicare pays for the biosimilars relative to the innovator biologic.

The innovator biologic gets it own payment code and its own 6 percent add-on. The biosimilar gets its own payment code, even if it is at a lower price, but it gets the 6 percent add-on that is associated with the innovator product.

So, from the prescriber's perspective, the physician who administers the drug, it is a neutral decision whether to use the innovator product or the biosimilar.

MedPAC has recommended that instead of those two products having unique codes, that you would potentially influence price to a much greater extent by combining them and having the program pay the average of the sales prices of those two products.

Ms. Kelly. Okay. And I understand what you are saying that there has only been a modest impact on prices --

1939 Mr. Matthews. That is right. 1940 Ms. Kelly. -- to date and your recommendations for what we can do about it. 1941 Can you discuss how original biologics and biosimilars 1942 1943 are currently grouped, and what the commission has recommended to result in price reduction there? 1944 1945 Mr. Matthews. Yeah. Again, under current payment 1946 policy the innovator biologics and each biosimilar get their 1947 own payment code. And, again, in an attempt to make the 1948 decision financially neutral from the prescriber's 1949 perspective, the 6 percent add-on for any of those products 1950 if the add-on associated with the originator product. 1951 And so, again, our recommendation would be that instead 1952 of having, let's say, a \$1,000 drug that gets a \$60 add-on, 1953 and then a \$100 drug or biologic that gets a \$60 add-on, that 1954 instead we would average the \$1,000 bio -- referenced 1955 biologic and the \$100 biosimilar and have Medicare pay that 1956 rate, which would give providers a much greater incentive to 1957 use the biosimilar and potentially start to move the price of 1958 the referenced biologic down in a way that we have not yet 1959 seen. 1960 Ms. Kelly. Is there, as we have been sitting here, is there anything that we haven't asked you that you want to 1961

1962	tell us?
1963	Mr. Matthews. No, ma'am. I do not want to venture any
1964	of my own questions here, so.
1965	Ms. Kelly. Well, thank you. A major goal of this
1966	committee in our drug pricing work to date has been to remove
1967	the barriers to generic competition and stop anticompetitive
1968	practices. It is important for us to continue to examine
1969	policies that would support competition in all markets to
1970	lower costs facing consumers. Everyone should have access,
1971	as you know, to the care and medication they need.
1972	And thank you, and I yield back.
1973	Ms. Eshoo.[Presiding.] The gentlewoman yields back.
1974	And I now would like to recognize the gentleman from
1975	Vermont, Mr. Welch.
1976	Mr. Welch. Thank you.
1977	Ms. Eshoo. Happy birthday to you.
1978	Mr. Welch. Well, thank you.
1979	Ms. Eshoo. Thank God you were born.
1980	Mr. Welch. Some people agree with that. Thank you.
1981	Dr. Matthews, really good testimony, so thank you very
1982	much, and really good work.
1983	It is really frightening, the cost of prescription
1984	drugs, and it is really frightening how the market power that

is out there is so aggressively used no matter how much pain is inflicted on folks. You know, I was here when Mr. Bucshon was raising some questions about a formulary. And a lot of people have that question: is that going to impede access. I was talking to Senator Grassley. He had that concern.

And one of the approaches that we took in Vermont, because here is the dilemma as I understand it, if you have a strict formulary you tend to get more savings but less patient choice. But if you have a wide open formulary with patient choice you get no savings. So how do you, how do you deal with that?

And what we did in Vermont is we basically made it pretty easy for a doctor to override what the formulary was because it might be that Mr. Bucshon, or Dr. Bucshon and I have the same condition but the medication that works for him is different than the one that works for me. I mean, is that a possible way to try to thread the needle here where we maintain patient choice but get the benefit where in the vast majority of time medication A is probably going to be good for Dr. Bucshon as well as good for me? Is that a possible path forward on this?

Mr. Matthews. Potentially. And as I said in my comments earlier, we do think that there should be very

2008 robust exceptions and appeals avenues available for Part D 2009 enrollees and their physicians. But at the same time, you 2010 know, we are trying to balance the plan's ability to leverage 2011 price from the manufacturer. And --2012 Mr. Welch. Right. And I agree with that. But the fact 2013 is that there is going to be a lot of resistance if there is 2014 an apprehension that a patient can't get the medication he or 2015 she needs. So it has to be simple. 2016 But the incentives that are built into the system right 2017 now that you outlined are totally in favor of higher prices. 2018 You know, if you can get somebody into the specialty drug 2019 program, then that is a real burden on the taxpayer. The 2020 patient has no clue really, because we rely on what the 2021 doctor tells us. 2022 So, I would just urge us to try to look for some way 2023 where we address this patient choice issue because I know a 2024 lot of my colleagues have that concern. I have that concern. 2025 Mr. Matthews. Sure. 2026 Mr. Welch. But we've got to get the benefit of that 2027 formulary. 2028 Now, the other thing is we are the only government that 2029 I am aware of that really doesn't play an active role in 2030 trying to provide some pricing protection to benefit our

2031	taxpayers and consumers. And you gave the shocking
2032	statistics about the specialty drugs and how awhile ago what
2033	was it, 33,000 people went immediately into
2034	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. That was in 2010. The number
2035	in 2017 is now 370,000.
2036	Mr. Welch. Yeah. So it is one prescription
2037	Mr. Matthews. Sure.
2038	Mr. Welch gets them into that high pay, high
2039	taxpayer pay situation.
2040	Now, would you be supportive of legislation which would
2041	have price negotiation available as a tool for MedPAC and, in
2042	the event that failed, have arbitration to come up with a
2043	price that is "fair"?
2044	Mr. Matthews. The commission has not weighed in on the
2045	broader question of direct negotiation. Our standing
2046	recommendation would include binding arbitration as part of
2047	our DVP proposal, which we recommended in 2017. And we are
2048	currently exploring whether or not binding arbitration could
2049	have a potentially greater role in the Medicare program. But
2050	we have not
2051	Mr. Welch. You could have the binding arbitration in
2052	some of the highest cost specialty drugs.
2053	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. That is correct.

2054 Mr. Welch. And that would have a huge impact on the 2055 cost of the overall to the taxpayer and to the plans. 2056 Correct? 2057 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir, that is correct. 2058 Mr. Welch. Yeah, I mean, you know, again I am going to 2059 focus on Dr. Bucshon here a minute because I know what a 2060 dedicated physician he has been. We just have this dilemma: you just can't have it all. Okay. You just can't have it 2061 2062 all. And the cost side on health care is where all the pain 2063 And if we just have these costs go out of control, continue to go out of control, that cuts off access. 2064 2065 So there has got to be some tradeoffs is my view here. 2066 Would you agree with that, Dr. Matthews? 2067 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. It is all about tradeoffs. 2068 Mr. Welch. And there is some argument that is always 2069 amde by the pharma companies that if there is some pushback 2070 on their pricing power, that somehow means they are not going 2071 to innovate. I find that to be bogus because they are 2072 spending more on advertising than they are on research. 2073 There is an enormous amount of research funded by taxpayers 2074 through the National Institute of Health. There is an 2075 enormous amount of research funded by taxpayers through the 2076 research and development tax credit.

2077	Do you see that if we have reasonable interaction by the
2078	government to negotiate prices or to have an arbitration
2079	system with neutral parties that that would have that
2080	would impede innovation?
2081	Mr. Matthews. As we have contemplated binding
2082	arbitration, we do not believe that it would stifle R&D for
2083	true innovative new products where the manufacturer would
2084	have an opportunity to come before a neutral arbitror, or
2085	arbitrator, I never know which the right word is, but present
2086	evidence in terms of R&D costs, in terms of foregone
2087	additional spending for the use of their product. And
2088	Mr. Welch. And you would get some transparency out
2089	there?
2090	Mr. Matthews. Yes.
2091	Mr. Welch. Again, Madam Chair, I think that is why this
2092	hearing is so important. I mean, this is not a he said/she
2093	said deal. We are all losing on this thing.
2094	So, I appreciate that testimony and the good work you
2095	have done over the years. And, hopefully, this committee can
2096	start moving forward to help bring these prices down.
2097	I yield back.
2098	Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman, and he yields back.
2099	And I also want to acknowledge, and I think I was

2100	leaving the hearing room to run downstairs to the other
2101	hearing, and I did not get to wish our colleague
2102	Congresswoman Robin Kelly a happy, blessed, wonderful
2103	birthday, because you are all three.
2104	With that, I am pleased to recognize the gentleman from
2105	Florida, Mr. Soto, for five minutes of questioning.
2106	Mr. Soto. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
2107	We saw in our committee analysis we are paying 104.3
2108	percent average sales price to providers, down from 1.6
2109	percent because of sequester. And we all realize this is an
2110	incentive to purchase drugs at a higher average sales price
2111	and receive a higher reimbursement.
2112	We saw CMS roll out a plan recently last year to have
2113	pharmaceutical vendors purchase and sell directly to
2114	patients, circumventing this provider cost escalation
2115	incentive, providing flat fees to providers and time
2116	reimbursements to international pricing.
2117	For my constituents at home will this do the job or are
2118	there other things we should be doing going along with what
2119	Congressman Ruiz talked about potential arbitration or other
2120	ideas? What is MedPAC advising?
2121	Mr. Matthews. Okay.
2122	Mr. Soto. Just broad points.

2123 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. So, I am not familiar with the 2124 proposal to have manufacturers sell directly to patients, if 2125 I understood your question correctly. So, again I would ask 2126 for the dispensation to come back to you on that point. 2127 With --2128 Mr. Soto. So, basically it is saying allow private 2129 sector pharmaceutical vendors to buy and bill Medicare for 2130 drugs and supply those drugs to providers, rather than the 2131 providers doing so directly? 2132 Mr. Matthews. Yes. So, this is part of the IPI 2133 proposal that the Administration has put forward. And again, 2134 while we do support the Administration's desire to reduce the 2135 prices that Medicare beneficiaries pay for prescription 2136 drugs, particularly in light of prices that citizens of other 2137 countries are paying, but at the same time we think there are 2138 certain logistical and implementation issues with respect to 2139 the Administration's proposal that would make it less likely 2140 to succeed than --2141 Mr. Soto. What are those specifically? 2142 Mr. Matthews. So, again, under the Administration's 2143 proposal, Medicare would set a price that it will pay the 2144 vendor based on the international reference price. And it is 2145 incumbent upon the vendor to try and obtain that price from

2146	manufacturers.
2147	But the proposal, if I recall correctly, does not give
2148	the vendor much by way of negotiating tools in order to
2149	extract that price.
2150	Mr. Soto. So, that is where this arbitration idea that
2151	is being mulled around in this committee
2152	Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir.
2153	Mr. Soto is so critical because that could create
2154	a more arms-length transaction to get the most efficient
2155	price. Is that correct?
2156	Mr. Matthews. That is correct.
2157	Mr. Soto. I wanted to move into some other ideas
2158	pitched by HHS, particularly step therapy and higher
2159	authorization. Certainly with lesser conditions these can be
2160	cost saving. But I worry when you apply it to cancer and
2161	other potentially fatal conditions that this step therapy and
2162	prior authorization, particularly step therapy, leads to time
2163	running out and people dying, literally, of cancer because
2164	they are given less effective drugs earlier on in the step
2165	therapy. And that we end with a death that could have been
2166	prevented.
2167	Do you think there should be a carve-out for cancer and
2168	other fatal conditions with regard to step therapy?

2169	Mr. Matthews. The commission has not contemplated the
2170	need for a carve-out or exceptions based on medical condition
2171	or a patient's diagnosis. But we have recognized, again, the
2172	need for a very robust and very expeditious exceptions and
2173	appeals process as part of the use of utilization management
2174	tools on the part of plans.
2175	Mr. Soto. And going into another issue that we continue
2176	to see is in the private market drug prices going three,
2177	four, ten times the amount of increases. What role should we
2178	play in stopping this from happening? And how does that
2179	affect Medicare when we see a drug that has been around for
2180	20 years that has a 10, 10 to 20 percent 10 to 20 times
2181	increase? What are you advising us to do?
2182	Mr. Matthews. Right. So that is actually an insightful
2183	distinction that if I could take a minute.
2184	Mr. Soto. Yes.
2185	Mr. Matthews. So, one, you know, we have seen the entry
2186	of truly revolutionary blockbuster products on the market
2187	that cure things like Hep C. So, the Sovaldis, the Harvonis
2188	where the benefits of the medication potentially warrant the
2189	prices that the manufacturer is charging.
2190	But we also see, and the commission is extremely
2191	concerned about instances that you just alluded to where you

2192	have products that have been on the market for decades where
2193	there is no real active research and development to
2194	increasing the efficacy of these products. And yet, the
2195	prices continue to increase year over year.
2196	And while there may be costs and R&D going on beyond,
2197	behind the scenes that people like me don't see, we still
2198	think that those kinds of cost increases are not warranted,
2199	given our responsibility to a public program like Medicare.
2200	And so, we have recommended an inflation rebate that would
2201	check the ability of manufacturers to increase their prices
2202	on a year over year basis in excess of some defined rate of
2203	inflation.
2204	Mr. Soto. Thank you. I yield back.
2205	Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
2206	It is a pleasure to recognize the gentleman from
2207	Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, for five minutes of questioning.
2208	Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you.
2209	Thank you, Dr. Matthews, your testimony today has been
2210	excellent. You are definitely going to get called back by
2211	many, many committees in the future.
2212	Mr. Matthews. I am sorry to hear that.
2213	Mr. Sarbanes. You did a great job.
2214	I wanted to pick up actually right where Congressman

2215 Soto left off because you mentioned this inflation rebate as 2216 a way of trying to get to some of these significant price --2217 Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir. Mr. Sarbanes. -- increases. And it seems to me that, 2218 2219 arguably, is the other side of a coin where you could think 2220 about setting, or we could think about setting upper limits 2221 on the prices of some of these drugs. It is just a different 2222 way of accomplishing the same thing. 2223 Would you agree with those as sort of two sides of the 2224 same coin potentially? 2225 Mr. Matthews. Potentially, yes. 2226 Mr. Sarbanes. Yeah. And I note that there is a number 2227 of states which have begun to explore regulating prescription 2228 drug pricing within their own jurisdictions. Maryland 2229 recently created, the Maryland General Assembly passed 2230 legislation. 2231 I think it is the first state to actually get this 2232 passed, it is now subject to the governor's signature, that 2233 would create a prescription drug affordability board. 2234 the board would have the authority to review drug cost data that manufacturers submitted, and then they could set an 2235 2236 upper payment limit on those prescription drugs. And I think 2237 there are six or seven other states that are exploring the

2238 same sort of approach.

We have talked about a number of strategies to address drug pricing. And we have also talked about how you have made recommendations on how Medicare can try to manage the situation downstream a little bit, if you view the original pricing that the manufacturers are setting as kind of the ultimate upstream point in the continuum.

There are all these efforts downstream, bringing the plans in, trying to incentivize them more to manage costs so the program isn't taking as big a hit, et cetera. But if we go to the source, which is the pricing that the manufacturers are setting, there is increasingly I think a sense in this Congress on both side of the aisle that we have to take some pretty dramatic steps to control the costs and the price setting at that end.

But what is your view of this concept of regulating or setting upper limits on the prices of these various categories of prescription drugs?

Mr. Matthews. Okay. So, so again, the commission hasn't taken a position with respect to setting a specific cap on a price. Although I do see the analogy between setting a hard cap on a price versus setting a cap on the rate that a price can increase over time.

I am also not personally familiar with the details of the state efforts that you have just described, but it is something we can start to look at and see if there is any model there.

But, with respect to our inflation rebate, it is guided by the notion that for drugs that have been on the market for some period of time where they are established therapies whose indications are known, and their effects are known, that to some extent these are commodities, and the expectation of commodity prices is that they should go down over time.

When you look at things like computers or wide screen T.V.'s you are getting better and better technology with each passing year at lower prices. And the question is why these trends work in reverse for prescription drugs, especially these therapies that are, again, long-extant on the market.

And so we think that at a minimum, setting a limit that those prices can increase year over year is a step in moderating these effects that we have seen that have very detrimental effects on the Medicare program.

Mr. Sarbanes. Well, I think we need to put every option on the table. The rebate is, I would say, a step in the right direction, an inflation rebate. But we need to be

2284	looking at negotiating power on the part of the Medicare
2285	program. Many have talked to that. The arbitration approach
2286	is another. Maybe some form of, like, public auction around
2287	the pricing of these drugs. And even the notion of
2288	regulating these, these drugs as a utility.
2289	I mean, if you look at there is a lot of, there is a lot
2290	of analogies you can draw between the public good aspect of
2291	how drugs are delivered to pretty much every American and the
2292	way electricity is delivered, or water is delivered, or, you
2293	know, health care premiums are set. So I think there is
2294	going to be a lot more activism on our part here in Congress
2295	with respect to the pricing of drugs.
2296	Thank you for your testimony today. This was extremely
2297	helpful. I yield back.
2298	Mr. Matthews. Thank you. Thank you.
2299	Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
2300	I am going to recognize myself for an additional five
2301	minutes, and also the ranking member as well for a couple of
2302	follow-up questions.
2303	First, Dr. Matthews, again thank you. I think it is
2304	very clear that the committee on a bipartisan basis clearly
2305	has more than an interest in addressing drug prices.
0006	

2306

I would encourage MedPAC to go back and continue to make

recommendations on how to protect patient access. I know that in the original legislation that created MedPAC, when Medicare Part D was created so was MedPAC. But to leave out patients in this, I mean, this is not just a program where numbers are shifted around. The numbers apply to people, to human beings. And I don't see how that element can be left out of your deliberations.

And as we work to reduce costs, that too has an effect on, as we have heard from questions and your responses, that too has an effect on patients.

Now, this whole issue of step therapy, I don't see how MedPAC can just stick with what seems to me a conversation about tools and the kit, et cetera, et cetera, when people have actually died because they don't have access to what they need. We can't ignore that, nor can MedPAC. So, while this step therapy has been created so that, as you describe it more tools in the kit to reduce and control pricing and whatever, when people are dying because they can't get what they need and they are pushed back to step one.

Step one the doctor knows is not going to work, step two the doctor knows is not going to work, but you never get to three because you haven't lived long enough, that doesn't make sense. It just doesn't. I mean, it is not defensible

2330 in my view and I think in other members' views as well. 2331 I don't know who supports this thing. It is from the both side of the aisle you have heard about it. We have 2332 heard from our constituents. They don't identify themselves 2333 2334 to us as Republicans or Democrats, they are our constituents. 2335 And the issue that you have raised that since the 2336 program was founded, was put together, that there has been a 2337 20 percent increase in D, if I heard you correctly, a 20 2338 percent increase on an annual basis relative to drug pricing 2339 is, to say it is a jaw-dropper doesn't begin to describe it 2340 And so I think we have our work cut out for us, but I 2341 think you do as well. And I think that MedPAC needs to step 2342 its game up, so to speak, in these, in these areas. And that 2343 you do it in a timely fashion so that you can make 2344 recommendations and some of these changes be recommended in 2345 these key areas. 2346 With that, I would like to recognize Mr. Bucshon and thank him for his support of an additional five minutes for 2347 2348 myself and for himself as well. Thank you again. 2349 Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I will make a few comments about the step therapy and 2350 2351 prior authorization. I mean, I have been a physician for 2352 years, for many years, and this has been a concept that has

waxed and waned for the 30 years or so that I have been in medicine. And, you know, it is a concept that waxes and wanes because at the end of the day I would argue it ultimately doesn't save anybody any money because the delay - it has a potential to delay therapy.

And then as a cardiovascular surgeon I saw people in tertiary care situations in their lives, and I just, I have always had concerns about that. And I don't know if anyone has, has looked at the long term implications of that. And it may not be -- it is probably out of the scope of what you look at.

Mr. Matthews. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bucshon. But looking at delay in therapy, potential delay in therapy -- and, again, my argument that physicians generally will make the decision to treat their patients based on what they think is the best individual therapy for that patient. And do consider cost. Don't get me wrong. As I mentioned, I considered cost if there was equivalent therapy.

The one thing I -- on the prior authorization, a number of years ago, maybe 10 or 15 years ago, there was one of the major private sector insurance companies that decided to drop their prior authorization program. Do you recall that at

2376	all?
2377	Mr. Matthews. I do not. I am sorry.
2378	Mr. Bucshon. It might have been UnitedHealthcare. I
2379	can't recall. And don't quote me on that, but I just and
2380	then it has been, I think it has been reinstituted. But the
2381	reasoning behind that, I remember when that happened, was is
2382	because they found that whoever this was, and I am not saying
2383	it was them, is that at the end of the day it didn't save
2384	them anything because they were authorizing about 98 or 99
2385	percent and the administrative costs to deny the 1 or 1.5
2386	percent didn't outweigh the savings.
2387	Have you heard of that type of concept?
2388	Mr. Matthews. I have heard similar anecdotes. Again, I
2389	can't attribute them to a specific
2390	Mr. Bucshon. Right.
2391	Mr. Matthews instance. But yes.
2392	Mr. Bucshon. Yeah. And I would argue that that is
2393	probably the case. The administrative costs if you are going
2394	to, you know, if you are going to deny 10 percent or
2395	something I, I get that. I would say I would have an ethical
2396	problem with that. But if you were, then it might save you
2397	money. I don't know what the finances are on that.
2398	But there is a perception that it saves money, and I am

2399	not sure that is actually true.
2400	So I want to comment, that is my comments on those two
2401	things.
2402	Do you know if CBO has ever done studies on out-of-
2403	pocket cost caps? Like, say, if there was a cap set at a
2404	certain level what the, what the CBO score would be? There
2405	will be a score, right, because there will be a potential
2406	number of people that would go over, that would normally be
2407	over that level, whatever that cap is.
2408	Mr. Matthews. I believe that is correct, yes.
2409	Mr. Bucshon. And is that something that you think would
2410	be interesting to know for your purposes?
2411	Mr. Matthews. This would be for?
2412	Mr. Bucshon. For Medicare Part D. Like an out-of-
2413	<pre>pocket cost cap; right?</pre>
2414	Mr. Matthews. Yes. And this is something that MedPAC
2415	has recommended as part of our package of Part D
2416	recommendations.
2417	Mr. Bucshon. Right. The question would be is what
2418	level that the out-of-pocket costs are capped at.
2419	Mr. Matthews. That is correct.
2420	Mr. Bucshon. So the question would be is a CBO score on
2421	that at differing levels might be interesting information to

2422	know. Would you agree or disagree with that? Or have they
2423	done it?
2424	Mr. Matthews. I am not aware that they have done this.
2425	But I don't disagree that it would be an interesting thing to
2426	know the effects at different level.
2427	Mr. Bucshon. Because if you were going, if Congress was
2428	going to say, okay, we are going to set an out-of-pocket cost
2429	cap at X dollars, right, the first thing we would do is get a
2430	CBO score.
2431	Mr. Matthews. Right.
2432	Mr. Bucshon. And see, well, what is that going to, what
2433	is that going to cost; right? Because there will be a cost
2434	if you set it, if you set it low enough there would be a
2435	cost.
2436	Mr. Matthews. Right.
2437	Mr. Bucshon. And so, maybe preemptively having a
2438	multitude of different cost levels known to Congress before
2439	we try to make some of these decisions might could be
2440	helpful. Would you think that would be the case?
2441	Mr. Matthews. Without committing my colleagues
2442	Mr. Bucshon. I understand. I am not asking
2443	Mr. Matthews to doing this work.
2444	Mr. Bucshon you for any commitment at all. Right.

2445	Mr. Matthews. That is correct, yes.
2446	Mr. Bucshon. Yeah. I think that might very well be
2447	helpful.
2448	With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
2449	Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
2450	Again I would like to thank you, Dr. Matthews, for your
2451	participation. And I hope that you didn't need to take any
2452	pain medication to come here today or anything else due to
2453	your testimony. But a first time out I think that we would
2454	all say that you, that you presented your case very well.
2455	I want to remind members that pursuant to committee
2456	rules they have ten business days to submit additional
2457	questions for the record to be answered by the witness who
2458	has appeared. We would appreciate your timely response to
2459	those, Dr. Matthews.
2460	And I, as I said, we really appreciate prompt responses
2461	to the question that you may receive.
2462	So, at this time, the subcommittee is adjourned.
2463	[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the subcommittee was
2464	adjourned.]